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INTRODUCTION

Alan battles multiple sclerosis,' the unpredictable and often debilitating
2
disease that disrupts the flow of information within the brain and body. Bill
worries whether his cardiac monitoring device will actually control his heart
arrhythmia and keep him alive. Charles considers buying the same kind of
assault rifle 4 used to mow down 20 children and 6 adults in a Newtown,
Connecticut, elementary school and 12 moviegoers in an Aurora, Colorado,
theater. Dylan begins growing marijuana. 6 And Erica, after turning to her sister
I
What is MS?, NAT'L MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS Soc'Y, http://www.nationalmssociety.org/Whatis-MS (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (defining multiple sclerosis as "an unpredictable, often
disabling disease of the central nervous system that disrupts the flow of information within the
brain, and between the brain and body").
2
Jonathan Mayer, MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of Telephone Metadata, WEB POL'Y (Mar.
12, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-the-sensitivity-of-telephone-metadatal.
Id.
4

Id.

Erica Goode, PopularAR-15 Style Rifle Used in Mass Killings, SEATTLE TiMEs (Dec. 17,
s
2012, 6:13 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/popular-ar-15-style-rifle-used-in-rec
ent-mass-killings/.
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for guidance, has an abortion.! How do we know this? We know this based on
simple analysis of the non-content information, or "metadata," that these people
inadvertently produced while using their cell phones.8
Despite not revealing communication content, metadata created by cell
phone usage-even "over a short time window" 9-creates an "unambiguously
sensitive" 10 mosaic of the user's personal life." Numbers dialed, the unique
serial number of a called phone, and the time and duration of calls are but a few
of the metadata records cell phone usage generates.1 2 Perhaps the most invasive
metadata record generated by cell phone usage is cell site location information
("CSLI")." CSLI creates a definitive record of a cell phone user's actual
physical movements.1 4 A functioning 5 cell phone automatically generates
CSLI by relaying its location to its user's service provider every seven
seconds,' 6 creating a real time record of the cell phone's movements with
enough specificity to pinpoint an individual's location on a specific floor of a
particular building.' Cell phone service providers, in turn, archive CSLI.

6

Mayer, supra note 2.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

10

Id.
Id.

"

Id.

12
Dan Albright, What Can Government Agencies Tell from Your Phone's Metadata?,
MAKEUSEOF (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/can-govemment-security-agenciestell-phones-metadata/#.
'3
See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014) (describing CSLI
stored by third-party cell phone service providers as "revealing [to government officials] 'the

antenna tower and sector to which the cell phone sends its signal' (quoting In re Application of

the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013))); In re Application of
the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F.
Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that CSLI "reveal[s] the general location-and,
in some circumstances, permit[s] law enforcement agents to track the precise movements-of a
particular cellular telephone on a real-time basis").
14
15

See Guerrero, 768 F.3d at 358; In re Prospective, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
Steven M. Harkins, CSLIDisclosure: Why Probable Cause Is Necessary to Protect What's

Left ofthe Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1875, 1881 n.29 (2011) (noting that cell
phones must be turned on in order to communicate with the network of the service provider).
16
Id. at 1877 (indicating that this process, known as registration, is the once-every-sevenseconds communication between your cell phone and the nearest cell phone tower, which is done
to find the tower with the strongest reception).
'7
Evan Perez & Siobhan Gorman, Phones Leave a Telltale Trail, WALL ST. J. (June 15,

2013, 12:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424127887324049504578545352803220
058.
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Moreover, in addition to the historical tracking capability enabled by
CSLI, today's cell phones can show authorities the "geographic movements of
the phone. . . as they occur," 19 contrary to Hollywood's frequent depiction that
police must keep a caller on the line for a specified length of time to
successfully trace the phone's location. 20 Realizing the utility of such
information in fighting crime, law enforcement has begun using CSLI in
criminal prosecutions to circumstantially demonstrate that a particular
defendant was in the same general area as a crime when it occurred.2 1 It comes
as little surprise that in the last five years, four federal circuits-the Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh-have considered challenges to the
constitutionality of the statute the government uses to obtain CSLI, 22 the Stored
Communications Act ("SCA").2 3

See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir.), vacated, 573 F. App'x
925 (11th Cir. 2014), aff'd on reh'g, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Historical, 724 F.3d at
611.
19
See In re Prospective, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 451. The court provided a comprehensive
explanation of this process, commonly known as triangulation:
[T]he process of determining the coordinates of a point based on the known
location of two other points. If the direction (but not distance) from each
known point to the unknown point can be determined, then a triangle can be
drawn connecting all three points. While only the length of one side of the
triangle is known at first (the side connecting the two known points), simple
trigonometry reveals the lengths of the other sides and so the position of the
third point. In the context of cell site information, the two known points are
the antenna towers, the third point is the cellular telephone, and the direction
from each tower to the phone is discerned from the information about which
face of each tower is facing the phone.
Another method of tracking the location of cellular telephones, which
also is sometimes called triangulation, is possible when a phone transmits
signals to three antenna towers at once. Based on the strength of a phone's
signal to a tower, and the time delay for the signal to reach the tower, one can
determine the distance between the phone and the tower. One can then draw
around the tower a circle, the radius of which is the distance from that tower
to the phone. The location of the phone can be pinpointed by drawing circles
around three of more towers and seeing where the circles intersect.
18

Id. at 451 n.3.
20
See, e.g., IRON MAN 2 (Paramount Pictures 2010). Billionaire, genius, playboy Tony
Stark,
fighting crime as Iron Man, receives a phone call from his arch nemesis, Ivan Vanko, at which
time Stark immediately utilizes his high-tech in-home computer system to initiate a call trace that
is ultimately unable to identify Vanko's location with any more specificity than the general New
York City area before Vanko hangs up. Id.
21
See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted,
Nos. 12-4659(L), 12-4825, 2015 WL 6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015); United States v. Davis,
785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).
22
Graham, 796 F.3d at 338; Davis, 785 F.3d at 500; In re Historical, 724 F.3d at 602; In re
Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 305 (3d Cir. 2010).
23
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2013).
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These four cases-two of which involved the opinions of federal
magistrates, 24 and two of which involved the appeal of criminal defendants2
raised Fourth Amendment challenges to the collection and admission in court
of CSLI obtained from cell phone service providers, pursuant to § 2703(d) of
the SCA.26 Section 2703(d) of the SCA allows the government to obtain a
warrant compelling cell phone providers to produce CSLI upon a
demonstration of "specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that [CSLI records] are relevant and material to
an ongoing criminal investigation."2 7 In contrast, the Fourth Amendment
requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause"28 -a higher
standard than what § 2703(d) of the SCA requires.
Because the burden necessary to issue a warrant under § 2703(d) of the
SCA is in conflict with the burden necessary to issue a warrant under the
Fourth Amendment, this Note argues that § 2703(d) of the SCA is
unconstitutional. 2 9 The reasonable suspicion requirement of § 2703(d) directly
conflicts with the plain language of the Fourth Amendment, thereby creating a
constitutional loophole the Founders would have never permitted. 30 Further,
persons maintain a subjective expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI
that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable, notwithstanding
the third-party exception. 3' Finally, the privacy interest of cell phone users in
their CSLI outweighs law enforcement's typical need to obtain such records. 32
In making this argument, this Note will first detail the history,
evolution, and modern application of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.33 Next,
Part III provides an overview of the SCA and its utilization by government
officials. Then, Part IV analyzes the circuit split created by the decisions of the

24
In re Historical, 724 F.3d at 602 (concluding that the SCA lessens the government's
burden of proof below what is required by the Fourth Amendment); In re Provider, 620 F.3d at
308 (concluding that a warrant for CSLI may not be authorized absent a showing of probable
cause).
25
See Graham, 796 F.3d at 338 (holding that "the government's warrantless procurement
of. . . CSLI was an unreasonable search in violation of Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights");
Davis, 785 F.3d at 500 (holding that a court order authorized by the SCA compelling the
production of a third-party telephone company's CSLI business records does not violate the
Fourth Amendment).
26
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2013); Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210; In re Historical, 724 F.3d at
605-15; In re Provider, 620 F.3d at 308-19.
27
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (emphasis added).
28
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
29
See infra Part V.
30
See infra Part V.C. 1.

31
32

See infra Part V.C.2-3.
See infra Part V.C.4.

3

See infra Part II.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 11
924

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118

Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, which affirm the constitutionality of
reasonable suspicion warrants of § 2703(d) of the SCA, and the vacated panel
decision of the Fourth Circuit,3 4 which held that such warrants violate the
Fourth Amendment. Finally, in Part V, this Note argues that § 2703(d) of the
SCA violates the Fourth Amendment because individuals have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI, and thus the government must
first obtain a warrant supported by probable cause-the burden necessitated by
the Fourth Amendment-to access historical CSLI.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PAST AND PRESENT

The American colonists endured British general warrants and writs of
assistance, which "allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an
unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity."3 Opposition to the
practice was so intense that it played a pivotal role in motivating the Revolution
itself.36 John Adams once noted, after hearing an impassioned 1761 speech
opposing the practice, that "[e]very man of a crowded audience appeared to me
to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against writs of assistance."3 7
Given their loathing of rampant governmental invasiveness, when the
Founders codified the "rights of man"38 to be forever preserved by the
Constitution-the "supreme Law of the Land" 39-they sought to limit the
ability of the government to invade individual privacy.4 0 Accordingly, since its
1791 ratification, the Fourth Amendment has safeguarded "[tihe right of people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures," and ensured that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'"' However, the
Fourth Amendment's scope is limited to preclude government inspections of
houses, persons, papers, and effects only if such examinations are deemed
searches or seizures.

See infra Part IV.D.1.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473,2494 (2014).
36
Id.
3
Id. (quoting 10 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMs 247-48 (C. Adams ed., 1856)).
38
Adamson v. People of California, 332 U.S. 46, 51 (1947) (noting that "the rights of
man ... are listed in the Bill of Rights").
3
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
40
See id amend. IV.
34
35

41

Id.

42

THOMAS

K.

CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION

4 (2d

ed. 2014).
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This Part outlines the evolution and modem application of the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, Section A examines the
Supreme Court's definition of "search" under the Fourth Amendment and how
it has changed over time. Next, Section B discusses the Supreme Court's
definition of "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Section C
reviews the reasonableness and warrant requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of their applicability to
law enforcement's use of cutting-edge investigative technology.
A.

Searches

Prior to the 1950s, 4 3 traditional Supreme Court jurisprudence did not
recognize the commission of a search unless a government officer committed a
"common-law trespass."44 This strict property-based trespass framework,
epitomized in Olmstead v. United States,45 holds that only the government's
physical intrusion into constitutionally protected tangible objects-i.e., one's
home, person, papers, and effects-implicates the Fourth Amendment.46 The
Court has accordingly held that governmental actions such as placing a drug
dog on the porch of a suspect's home,47 extracting an unwilling suspect's blood
to determine his level of intoxication, 4 8 patting down an individual, 4 9 and
attaching a GPS tracker to a vehicleo constitute Fourth Amendment searches.
However, by 1967, in the seminal case Katz v. United States,si the
Court announced a significant Fourth Amendment paradigm shift. In Katz, the
FBI "bugged," or implanted, a listening device in a public telephone booth to

43

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).

4

Id.

45
277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928) (noting that because the actual wire taps used to monitor the
conversations of and ultimately convict the defendants were placed along exterior telephone
lines, "insertions were made without trespass upon any property of the defendants," and the
Fourth Amendment was not violated (emphasis added)).
46
CLANCY, supra note 42, at 361.
47
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (regarding "the area 'immediately
surrounding and associated with the home'-what our cases call the curtilage-as 'part of the
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes"' (emphasis added) (quoting Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984))).
48
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966).
49
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223-24 (1973) (pack of cigarettes
containing heroin discovered after officer examined suspect's pockets); Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40, 65 (1968) (envelopes of heroin discovered after officer examined suspect's pockets);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7 (1968) (gun discovered after exterior probe of suspect's clothing);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90 (1964) (envelope containing illegal municipal forms discovered
after searching arrestee's socks).
50
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
s1
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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catch a defendant placing illegal bets.52 The Court held this search to be
unconstitutional and, for the first time, the Court declared that the "Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."S 3 The Court nevertheless tempered
the scope of such a seemingly sweeping precedent by declaring that "[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection." 54
Thus, since 1967, the Supreme Court has recognized an alternative to
strict physical trespass: any governmental search "violat[ing] a person's
'reasonable expectation of privacy"'" is subject to Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. 56 A reasonable expectation of privacy is established in those places,
objects, or conversations in which (1) an individual has "exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy" that (2) "society is prepared to recognize as
[objectively] 'reasonable."' 57 Failure of an individual to satisfy either of the
test's two prongs means a governmental intrusion is not a search, removing
such intrusion from the scope of Fourth Amendment protection.58
In addition to protecting against unreasonable searches, the Fourth
Amendment also protects against unreasonable seizures. Accordingly, the
following section elaborates on what is considered a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
B. Seizures
The Supreme Court first explicitly defined seizures under the Fourth
Amendment59 in the 1968 landmark case Terry v. Ohio.60 In Terry, a police
officer stopped, or "seized," and patted down two individuals that he suspected
were planning to rob a store.61 The Terry Court announced that "[w]henever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has 'seized' that person."6 2 Thus, law enforcement officers execute a personal
seizure both by physically restraining someone 63 and by showing authority,64 a

52

Id at 348.

53

56

Id at 351.
Id. (emphasis added).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 (emphasis added).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).

57

Id at 361.

58

Id. (noting that "the rule that has emerged ...
CLANCY, supra note 42, at 5.

54
5s

59
60

61

is that there is a twofold requirement").

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 5-7.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 19 n.16 (defining a seizure as "[w]hen the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen").
62

63
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common example of which is brandishing a firearm.65 Ultimately, "the proper
inquiry 'is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."' 66
The most common examples may involve persons, but the Fourth
Amendment is not limited to the seizure of persons. Although it is often a
highly fact-specific inquiry, 7 the Fourth Amendment also typically shields real
property and other objects in which individuals possess a liberty interest. 68
Property is considered seized by the government "when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that
property"; 69 seizure of objects in which individuals possess a liberty interest
occurs, for example, upon the warrantless interception of electronic data or
sound waves carrying communications.70
Building on these concepts, the following section interprets
reasonableness as it pertains to Fourth Amendment searches and seizures, and
expounds upon the warrant requirement therein.
C. Reasonablenessand the WarrantRequirement

If an individual's privacy or liberty interests are implicated by a
governmental search or seizure, "the ultimate touchstone of [that search or
seizure under] the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness.' 7 ' The Framers
selected such an "imprecise and flexible term" 72 because they realized "that
searches and seizures were too valuable to law enforcement to prohibit them
entirely," 73 but they knew that unfettered government power might become an
instrument of tyranny. 74
Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence has done little to clarify the
definition of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Not only is Fourth

id.
See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203-04 (2002) (citing Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 432 (1991)).
6
65

66

Id.

See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
68
See CLANCY, supra note 42, at 7-11.
69
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). "[M]eaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests" constitutes a seizure of such property. Id. at 113 n.5.
70
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1213 (11th Cir.), vacated, 573 F. App'x 925 (11th
Cir. 2014), aff'don reh'g, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).
n1
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
72
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 75 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
67

73

Id.

74

See discussion infra Part V.A.
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Amendment analysis highly fact-specific,75 but concretely defining
reasonableness is complicated by the Supreme Court's recognition of both the
trespass and the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy theories as legitimate
grounds upon which a search or seizure may be found unreasonable. In
addition to the confusion created by the application of multiple tests, the Katz
test is highly malleable because it is predicated on the subjective beliefs of
individuals and whether an ever-evolving society is willing to recognize their
beliefs as reasonable. Thus, "no clearly articulated standard exists as to what
constitutes an 'unreasonable search' under the Fourth Amendment," 77 and the
potentially "subjective and unpredictable" nature of the Fourth Amendment is
simply compounded by the perpetual advancement of technology.78
What has remained constant, however, is a general confidence in the
validity of a search or seizure authorized by a judicial warrant. The Framers
believed that the "formal processes associated with specific warrants, including
the judicial assessment of whether there was adequate cause for the intrusion,
provided the best means of preventing violations" of liberty. 79 The Supreme
Court has similarly maintained that the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of
"reasonableness generally requires the [government's] obtaining of a judicial
warrant" supported by probable cause prior to its execution of a search or
seizure. 80
According to the Supreme Court, warrants ensure that the inferences
necessary to support a search are "drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime," while also providing "fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.",82 Accordingly, absent "a few

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
76
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 ("[Tlhe Katz reasonable-expectationof-privacy test has been added to, but not substitutedfor, the common-law trespassory test.").
n
Jeremy Derman, Constitutional Law: Maryland District Court Finds Government's
Acquistion of Historical Cell Site Data Immune from Fourth Amendment: United States v.
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012), 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 297,299 (2013).
78
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) ("It would be foolish to contend that the
degree of privacy secured to citizens ... [is] unaffected by the advance of technology. ... The
question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the
realm of guaranteed privacy.").
79
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, in THE FOURTH
7

AMENDMENT: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY

DEBATE 32, 34 (Cynthia Lee ed., 2011).
80
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
81
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
82
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
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specifically established and well-delineated exceptions-83-such as searches
incident to arrest, 84 hot pursuit of a felony suspect," or some other set of
exigent circumstances rendering
obtaining a warrant objectively
impractical 8 6-warrantless searches or seizures by the government are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.8 7
The following subsection examines another exception to the warrant
requirement: the third-party exception doctrine. Among the many warrant
requirement exceptions, this exception is most applicable to the questions of the
constitutionality of the SCA's § 2703(d).
1.

General Third-Party Exception Doctrine

The Fourth Amendment exception perhaps most applicable to the
question of the protection of CSLI is the third-party exception doctrine,
established in United States v. Miller.88 The third-party exception allows
government officials to obtain information initially revealed to a third-party
"even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in a third-party will not be
betrayed."89
In Miller, federal law enforcement officials in the Treasury
Department's Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau ("ATFB") suspected
Miller of participating in the operation of an illegal whiskey distillery.? In its
investigation, the ATFB obtained copies of Miller's checks and other bank
records, 91 pursuant to subpoenas issued by a United States Attorney rather than
a judge. 92 The records were ultimately admitted at Miller's trial and used

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
84
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (holding that officers are able to search
an arrestee both to detect weapons that may be used to harm the officer or effect the arrestees
escape, as well as to detect any evidence on the arrestee's person in order prevent its concealment
or destruction).
85
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (citing McDonald v. United States, 33
U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
86
See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
87
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
88
425 U.S. 435, 438-47 (1976).
89
Id. at 443.
90
Id. at 437.
91
Id. at 437-38.
83

92

Id. at 438-39.
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against him as proof of his participation in the distillery. 93 Miller appealed their
admission. 94
The Court held that Miller maintained no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his subpoenaed bank records because they were not his "private
papers," and he could not assert ownership or possession of them. 95 Rather,
they were the third-party bank's business records.96 The obtained documents
contained information "voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their
employees in the ordinary course of business," further supporting the Court's
conclusion that Miller's financial records were the unprotected business records
of his bank. 97 The Court accordingly cautioned that an individual "takes the
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed
by that person to the government."98
Thus, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected." 99 The government implicates "no Fourth
Amendment interests of the depositor" by coercing the bank to produce its
records, "even if a criminal prosecution is contemplated at the time" the records
are acquired.' 0 0
Whereas the third-party doctrine has typically been applied with ease to
tangible objects, such as bank records, its application to modem technologyand the intangible-is not that easy. The following subsection discusses
Supreme Court cases that address the inherent conflict between the individual
privacy rights outlined in the Fourth Amendment and law enforcement's use of
increasingly sophisticated technology.
2. Technology, the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, and the ThirdParty Doctrine
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is frequently
difficult to reconcile with modem technological processes employed by law
enforcement. Consequently, courts have relied on such disparate cases as Smith
v. Maryland,10 Kyllo v. United StateS,1 02 United States v. Jones,103 Riley v.

93

94
95
96

9
98
99

1oo
101

Id. at 438.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (citations omitted).
Miller, 425 U.S. at 444.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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California,'" United States v. Knotts, 05 and United States v. Karolo6 to
determine the Fourth Amendment's application to CSLI and other technologies.
The Smith, Knotts, and Karo opinions rule against individual privacy; 0 7
whereas, Kyllo, Jones, and Riley invalidate various governmental actions on
Fourth Amendment grounds.10 8 The following subsections will provide a brief
synopsis of each case.
i.

Smith v. Maryland: Warrantless Use ofa Pen Register to
Obtain Dialed Numbers Is Not an UnreasonableSearch

In Smith, the Court held that telephone users "can claim no legitimate
[subjective] expectation of privacy" in the numbers they dial.' 9 While
investigating Smith for robbery, police requested that a telephone company
install a pen registero to record the numbers dialed from his home
telephone."' The pen register was authorized by neither warrant nor court
order.1 2 It ultimately confirmed that Smith was the robber," 3 and he was
subsequently convicted of the crime.114
The Court stated that "[a]ll telephone users realize that they must
'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through

102
1o3

10
105
106

533 U.S. 27 (2001).
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
468 U.S. 705 (1984).

107
See Karo, 468 U.S. at 718; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285; Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735,
745-46 (1979).
108
See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948-49; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 40-41 (2001).
109
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (noting that when the defendant used his phone, he "voluntarily
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its
equipment in the ordinary course of business").

110

Id. at 736 n. 1. Smith defines a pen register as

"a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by
monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is

released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate
whether calls are actually completed." A pen register is "usually installed at a
central telephone facility [and] records on a paper tape all numbers dialed
from [the] line" to which it is attached.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
"'

Id. at 737.

112

Id.

114

Id.

"14

Id. at 738.
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telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed." 15
Accordingly, the warrantless use of a pen register at the behest of the police did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because people were likely to not "entertain
any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial." 1
ii.

United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo: Items Are
Not Searched When Viewed with the Naked Eye from a
Lawful Vantage Point

Knotts and Karo involved the constitutionality of homing devices
placed in personal property by law enforcement to track the property's
location.' 17 In Knotts, with the consent of a chloroform manufacturer, the police

placed a tracking device in a drum of chloroform to be sold to persons
suspected of using it to produce methamphetamine."' When visual surveillance

failed, the police used the tracker to follow the drum to a cabin in the woods,
which they lawfully observed for three days in order to obtain a search
warrant.119 A subsequent search uncovered the cabin's methamphetamine
lab.1 2 0 The Court upheld the device's use because, despite enhancing the senses
of law enforcement by maintaining a virtual visual of the drum even when the
physical tail was lost, it merely revealed what could have been seen with the
naked eye: the driver's movements on a public highway. 12 1
The next year, in Karo, as in Knotts, the Court dealt with the
constitutionality of the use of a tracking device by law enforcement; 12 2
however, the Court in Karo reached the opposite decision.1 23 In Karo, with the
consent of a chemical dealer, law enforcement placed a tracking beeper in a
drum of ether. 124 Police suspected the ether had been ordered to produce illegal
drugs.1 25 Relying on the tracking device, police followed the drum to a private
home.1 26 In the ensuing days, police used the device to track the drum between

115
116
117

Id. at 742.
Id.
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.

276, 277 (1983).
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277-78.
Id. at 278-79.
Id at 279.
Id. at 285.
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
Id. at 705.
Id at 708.

Id
Id.
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three private homes and a commercial storage facility. 127 The Court held that
monitoring a tracking device within a private residence, which grants police
insight into an area not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth
Amendment rights of those with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
home. 12 8

iii. Kyllo v. United States: Use of a Thermal Imaging Device to
See Within a Home Constitutes a Search
In Kyllo,129 law enforcement officials suspected Kyllo of growing
marijuana in his home but lacked sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant
to search the premises. 13 0 Nonetheless, police were aware that indoor marijuana
production typically requires many high-intensity lamps that generate a
significant amount of heat.13 ' Accordingly, police scanned Kyllo's home with a
thermal imaging device, revealing such a signature.1 32 Based on the thermal
imaging and other corroborating information, the agents obtained a warrant to
search the home and uncovered a marijuana growing operation containing over
100 marijuana plants. 33

The Court held that the use of a thermal imager to gain information
undetectable with natural senses constituted a search, particularly when such
technology is "not in general public use." 34 Criticized by the dissent as
creating a malleable rule that is "unnecessary, unwise, and inconsistent with the
Fourth Amendment,"135 Kyllo requires continual reevaluation of advances in
technology 361to determine whether the new technology is sufficiently in the
public use so as to erode the Fourth Amendment's protections.137

127
128
129
130

Id.
Id. at 716, 718.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
See id at 29.

131

See id.

132

Id

133

Id.

Id. at 34 (holding that "obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information ... that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area,' constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use" (citation omitted)).
13s
Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136
See, e.g., FLIR One, FLIR, http://www.flir.com/flirone/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2015). The
advanced investigative technology at issue in Kyllo can now be utilized on cell phones.
137
Harkins, supranote 15, at 1892.
134

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 11

934

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 118

iv. United States v. Jones: WarrantlessApplication of a GPS
Tracking Device to Property Constitutes an Unreasonable
Search
Over a decade after Kyllo, the Court decided Jones,138 which pertained
to the constitutionality of the warrantless application of a tracking device to the
vehicle of a man suspected of trafficking illegal drugs.1 3 9 Reviving the
traditional Fourth Amendment trespass theory but not thereby disposing of the
reasonable expectation of privacy theory, 14 0 the Court held that warrantless use
of a GPS tracker on Jones's personal property was a common law trespass that
invalidated any evidence cultivated from it.141 Justices Sotomayorl 4 2 and
Alitol 43 filed separate concurrences in Jones, applying the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard, with three other Justices joining Alito's
opinion.'4
Justice Sotomayor held that GPS tracking of Jones's whereabouts over
time was an unreasonable search.1 45 She argued that it might be necessary to
reconsider the fundamental premise of the third-party doctrine, particularly as
manifested in a digital context, because it "is ill suited for the digital age."l46
Similarly, Justice Alito held that it was the length of time Jones was monitored
that established a search under the Fourth Amendment.1 47 Taken together, the
Sotomayor and Alito concurrences create what has been called the "mosaic"
theory of Fourth Amendment interpretation,1 4 8 which allows courts to assess

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id. at 948. Police possessed a properly obtained warrant, however, the warrant authorized
the GPS tracker to be applied within ten days and within the District Columbia, and it was
applied on the 11th day in Maryland. Id. Twenty-eight days of data were compiled and used
against Jones at trial to obtain his conviction for conspiracy to traffic illegal substances. Id.
140
Id. at 952. "[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not
substitutedfor, the common-law trespassory test." Id
141
Id. at 949.
142
Id. at 955. "I agree with Justice ALITO that, at the very least, 'longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy."' Id.
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)).
143
Id. at 958. "I would analyze the question presented in this case by asking whether
respondent's reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the
movements of the vehicle he drove." Id (Alito, J., concurring in the result).
144
Id. at 957. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Alito's concurrence.
145
Id. at 954-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
146
Id. at 957.
147
Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
148
See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L.
REv. 311,
313 (2012). Kerr offers the following definition:
Under the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective sequence
of steps rather than as individual steps. Identifying Fourth Amendment
138
139
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the constitutionality of government searches and seizures by viewing them
collectively rather than by viewing them sequentially in isolated steps. 149
v.

Riley v. California: WarrantlessSearches of a Cell Phone
Incident to Arrest Are Impermissible Under the Fourth

Amendment
Finally, in 2014, the Court decided Riley,so a consolidation of two
similar cases,"' holding that police may not search an arrestee's cell phone
without a warrant. 152 In Riley, police searched the contents of the defendant's
cell phone upon its discovery during a lawful arrest, extracted evidence from it,
and later used that evidence against him at trial to obtain a conviction.'15 The
Court found that law enforcement's need to obtain the contents of an arrestee's
cell phone satisfied none of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment.1 54
Accordingly, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires law
enforcement to obtain a warrant before examining the contents of an arrestee's
cell phone.' 55

The Court additionally stated that the data stored on a cell phone is
unique from tangible objects both quantitatively and qualitatively.15 Not only
did the Court recognize that cell phones can contain vast amounts of
information utterly impossible to be carried physically,1 5 7 but also that they can
searches requires analyzing police actions over time as a collective "mosaic"
of surveillance; the mosaic can count as a collective Fourth Amendment
search even though the individual steps taken in isolation do not.
Id. (citations omitted).
149
Id. at 320.
150
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
151

Id. at 2480.

152

Id at 2495.

153

Id at 2480-82.

Id. at 2485. The Court held that the contents of an arrestee's cell phone pose no risk to
officer safety. Id. Officer safety motivated the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1967). The Court also held that the
contents of an arrestee's cell phone are not so susceptible to destruction as to render obtaining a
warrant before examining them objectively unreasonable. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486-88.
Preventing imminent destruction of evidence motivated the exigent circumstances exception to
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2494.
05
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 ("Our answer to the question of what police must do before
searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is . . . simple-get a warrant.").
154

156

Id. at 2489.

15
Id. The Court distinguished the information storage capacity of a cell phone from that of
traditional tangible objects typically used to carry information on one's person:
One of the most notable distinguishing features of modem cell phones is their
immense storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a person was
limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only
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reconstruct years of an individual's private life.' 58 Finally, the Court noted that
cell phones are unique in that they can uncover one's specific movements down
to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building. 159
Confronted with the facts in Riley, the Court was forced to educate itself on the
nuances of cell phone technology and-for the first time-make a substantive
ruling based on these nuances.1 60
The next Part discusses the SCA, the federal statute currently being
utilized by law enforcement to obtain historical CSLI. The discussion includes
a brief overview of both how the SCA came to be, and its subsections
authorizing law enforcement's acquisition of CSLI.
III. THE SCA AND ITS REASONABLE SUSPICION WARRANTS

Law enforcement currently uses the SCA to obtain CSLI from cell
phone service providers as circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a
criminal defendant was in a particular location at the same time a crime was
committed.161 This Part provides a brief history of that statute, as well as an
examination of its subsections authorizing the practice.
Signaling the Legislature's recognition that cell phone technology is a
rapidly changing and important component of modem society, Congress passed

a narrow intrusion on privacy.... Most people cannot lug around every piece
of mail they have received for the past several months, every picture they
have taken, or every book or article they have read-nor would they have
any reason to attempt to do so. And if they did, they would have to drag
behind them a trunk of the sort held to require a search warrant in
Chadwick ... rather than a container the size of the cigarette package in
Robinson.
Id. (citations omitted).
158
Id. The Court demonstrated how the data contained on a cell phone is qualitatively
different than vessels traditionally carried on one's person for storage purposes such as wallets:
The sum of an individual's private life can be reconstructed through a
thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the
same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a
wallet. Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone,
or even earlier. A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding
him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record of all his communications
with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would routinely be kept on a
phone.
Id.
159
Id. at 2490.
160
See R. Craig Curtis, Michael C. Gizzi & Michael J. Kittleson, Using Technology the
FoundersNever Dreamed of Cell Phones as Tracking Devices and the FourthAmendment, 4 U.
DENV. CRIM. L. REv. 61, 75 (2014).
161
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1213 (11th Cir.), vacated, 573 F. App'x
925 (11th Cir. 2014), affdon reh'g, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss2/11

18

Boyce: The Stored Communications Act: Property Law Enforcement Tool or I

2015]

THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS A CT

937

the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") in 1986.162 The intent of
the ECPA was to update and clarify federal privacy protections and standards
in light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications
technologies. 63 Within the larger statutory scheme of the ECPA was the SCA.
Eight years later, in 1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") in part to amend and update the SCA. 1 6
The SCA "create[d] a set of Fourth Amendment-like privacy
protections by statute, regulating the relationship between government
investigators and [cell phone as well as Internet] service providers in
possession of users' private information."' 6 5 These purported safeguards are
achieved in two ways. First, the SCA restricts the government's ability to
compel disclosure by service providers of customer data in its possession by
establishin6 specific procedures that the government must follow to obtain
CSLI data. 66 Second, the SCA generally limits the ability of service providers
to voluntarily release such information-although numerous exceptions
*167

exist.

One such protection takes shape in § 2703(c)(1)(A), which requires the
government to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause1 68 in order to
compel service provider production of records in "temporary 'electronic
storage' for 180 days or less."l 69 Another, more lenient, SCA provision
protecting records "in electronic storage for greater than 180 days" 7 0 is found

162
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
163
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555.
164
In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 306 (3d Cir. 2010). "In 1994, Congress enacted the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279, 4292 (1994) (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2010)), in part to amend
the SCA." Id.
165
Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored CommunicationsAct, and a Legislator's Guide
to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1208, 1212 (2004).
166
See id. (citing Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2000 & Supp. 12001)).
167
Id. at 1213 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2013)). Customer records, such as CSLI, may be
divulged by a service provider storing such records in the following situations: (1) when a
warrant is obtained pursuant to § 2703(d) of the SCA, (2) with the customer or subscriber's
consent, (3) when necessary to render service or to protect the provider's rights or property, (4) to
a government entity based upon good faith belief of an emergency in which someone is in danger
of death or serious physical harm requiring the information, (5) to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children, and (6) to any person other than a government entity. Id. at
1221.
168
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (2013) (requiring the police to obtain a warrant by utilizing the
procedure laid out in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
169
See Kerr, supra note 165, at 1218-19.
170
Id. at 1219.
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in § 2703(d)."' Section 2703(d) requires the government to obtain a court order
outlining "specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents ... are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation." 72 This more relaxed standard is essentially a
reasonable suspicion standard.17 1
Reasonable suspicion 74 permits a "brief, investigatory stop, when the
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot" 75
based upon the totality of the circumstances.176 An officer must possess "a
minimal level of objective justification"177 amounting to more than inchoate,
unparticularized hunches of criminal activity"'8 in order to briefly detain or
seize an individual or his constitutionally protected property. Although not
"readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,"'7 9 properly
placed on a proof continuum, "reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding
standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence." 80
Thus, under the SCA, the government has at its disposal numerous
mechanisms by which it may compel cell phone service providers to turn over
CSLI, only one of which complies on its face with the Fourth Amendment's
requirement that no warrant shall issue absent a governmental presentation and
18
Therefore, the central inquiry regarding
judicial finding of probable cause.s
the government's acquisition of CSLI must be whether the Fourth Amendment
"covers not only content [of electronic communications], but also the
transmission itself when it reveals information about the personal source of the
transmission, specifically his location."l 82 Debate over the proper adjudication

171

See 18 U.S.C.

172

Id

§ 2703(d).

17
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d
283, 287 (4th Cir. 2013).
174
See supra Part II.B.

175
176

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).

'7

1
180

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
Id at 124 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.

181

U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.

17

United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1213 (1lth Cir.), vacated, 573 F. App'x 925 (11th
Cir. 2014), aff'don reh'g, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).
182
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of this issue has been a recent focus of the federal judiciary, and the following
Part outlines the principal cases in this discussion.1 3
IV. THE SPLIT: PROVIDER, HISTORICAL, DAVIS, AND GRAHAM

The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of §
2703(d) of the SCA. 18 4 Similarly, the federal appellate judiciary has developed
minimal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence governing challenges to
governmental obtainment of CSLI pursuant to the Act.' 85 Furthermore, the
plain language of the SCA, requiring reasonable suspicion for CSLI warrants,
conflicts with the plain language of the Fourth Amendment, requiring probable
cause for warrants to lawfully issue.186 Consequently, no mandatory judicial
paradigm exists that courts must consistently and coherently apply to SCAbased CSLI challenges.'8 As a result, the federal circuits are split on whether
the reasonable suspicion threshold of § 2703(d) of the SCA satisfies the Fourth
Amendment.' 8 This Part discusses the split between the Third, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits, which affirm § 2703(d)'s constitutionality, and the Fourth
Circuit, which rejects § 2703(d)'s constitutionality.
A.

The Third Circuit:Provider

In its 2010 decision, In re Application of United States for an Order
Directinga ProviderofElectronic Communication Service to Disclose Records
to the Government,18 9 the Third Circuit became the first court of appeals to
address the constitutionality of the SCA's "specific and articulable facts"

183

There is also discord among the states on this exact issue. See, e.g., Eric Lode, Annotation,

Validity of Use of Cellular Telephone or Tower to Track Prospective, Real Time, or Historical
Position ofPossessorofPhone Under State Law, 94 A.L.R. 6th 579 (2014).
184
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1211.
18

Curtis, Gizzi & Kittleson, supra note 160, at 80. Collecting cases, the article asserts that

through 2013, eight federal appellate cases have addressed challenges to the constitutionality of
CSLI. Id. An analysis of these cases, however, reveals that four cases do not challenge access of
CSLI by the government pursuant to the SCA, one case was unreported, two are Historicaland

Provider, and one relied solely on Provider for guidance from the federal courts of appeals. Id
186

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

See Curtis, Gizzi & Kittleson, supra note 160, at 61. It should be noted, however, that the
judges from the three circuits that have squarely dealt with the issue of the SCA's
187

constitutionality have predominately employed the third-party exception
Amendment warrant requirement as articulated in Miller and Smith. Id

to

the Fourth

188
See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1205; In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data,
724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
189

620 F.3d 304.
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standard. 190 In Provider, federal law enforcement officials requested a §
2703(d) warrant to obtain the CSLI of a suspected drug dealer. 191 The federal
magistrate judge denied the application chiefly on the ground that the SCA
violated the probable cause requirement for warrants under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.1 9 2 The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's order,
and the case was appealed to the Third Circuit. 93
Focusing less on the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and more
on the language of the SCA itself,1 94 the Providerdecision reversed the district
court.' 95 Largely ignoring the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
requirement, the court concentrated both on the SCA's plain language
requirement of reasonable suspicion and the absence of legislative history
indicating a preference that the "Government . . show probable cause as a
predicate for a court order under § 2703(d)." 9 Accordingly, the court held that
CSLI "is obtainable under a § 2703(d) order" not requiring "the traditional
probable cause determination. Instead, the standard is governed by the text of §
2703(d) ... [a] standard [that] is a lesser one than probable cause, a conclusion
is supported by the legislative history." 9 7 Thus, the Third Circuit
that . .
generally sidestepped a detailed, critical analysis of the Fourth Amendment
altogether' 9 8 and ultimately endorsed the SCA.
B. The Fifth Circuit: Historical
In 2013, In re Application of the United States for HistoricalCell Site
Data'99 arose from federal § 2703(d) applications for CSLI relevant to three
separate criminal investigations.2 00 In Historical, the federal magistrate judge
rejected the applications after determining that "[c]ompelled warrantless
disclosure of cell site data violates the Fourth Amendment." 2 01 The district
court issued an order affirming the magistrate judge's determination and
concluding that CSLI "may be acquired only by a warrant issued on probable

190

Id. at 305-07.

192

Id. at 307-08.

192

Id. at 308.

193

Id. at 305.

194

See Curtis, Gizzi & Kittleson, supra note 160, at 69.

9

196
197
198
199
200

In re Provider, 620 F.3d at 313.

Id. at 315.
Id. at 313.
See Curtis, Gizzi & Kittleson, supra note 160, at 69.
724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2014).

Id. at 602.

Id. (quoting In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d
827, 846 (S.D. Tex. 2010)).
201
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cause" and, accordingly, that the "standard under the Stored Communications
Act is below that required by the Constitution." 2 02 The government appealed
the district court order to the Fifth Circuit.203
In overturning the district court, the Fifth Circuit rejected the ACLU's
contention that the SCA's constitutionality is properly reviewed under the
Supreme Court's tracking devices precedent. Rather, the Fifth Circuit adopted
the government's position that the Supreme Court's business records precedent
controls 204 and proceeded with such analysis. 2 05
In Historical, the Fifth Circuit recited the basic premise of the thirdparty exception to the Fourth Amendment: the information an individual
voluntarily conveys to others enjoys no reasonable expectation of privacy,
whether digital or tangible.206 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect a cell phone user's CSLI because he
"understands that his cell phone must send a signal to a nearby cell tower in
order to wirelessly connect his call."207 The Historical court further held that
cell phone users enjoy no expectation of privacy in CSLI because cell service
contracts "expressly state that a provider uses a subscriber's location
information to route his cell phone calls"208 and "that the providers not only use
the information, but collect it." 2 0 9

The court then turned to the next step in the Supreme Court's thirdparty exception jurisprudence-whether such disclosure is voluntary. 21 0 The
Fifth Circuit observed that "[t]he Government does not require a member of the
public to own or carry a phone." 2 11 Further, the Historical decision observed
that because telephone monopolies are a past phenomenon, "the Government
does not require [a cell phone user] to obtain his cell phone service from a
particular service provider that keeps historical cell cite records for its

202
203

Id. at 603.
Id.

Id. at 615. "Using the proper framework, the SCA's authorization of § 2703(d) orders for
historical cell site information if an application meets the lesser 'specific and articulable facts'
standard, rather than the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard, is not per se
unconstitutional." Id.
204

205

Id.

Id. at 613 (citing United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012)). "There is
no Fourth Amendment violation because Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the data given off by his voluntarily procured pay-as-you-go cell phone." Id
207
Id. (citing United States v. Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357, at *8 (S.D.
Fla. July 30, 2012)).
206

208
209
210
211

Id.
Id.
Id. at 612-14.
Id at 613.
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subscribers, either." 212 Nor does the government "require him to make a call, let
alone to make a call at a specific location."2 13
Finally, the court acknowledged that although many citizens "may
reasonably want their location information to remain private," it ultimately
rejected the temptation to unilaterally extend the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to historical CSLI.2 14 Instead, the court deferred to Congress to
remediate the law by enacting appropriate legislation.2 15 The Fifth Circuit noted
that during periods of "dramatic technological change, the best solution to
privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is well situated to
gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy
and public safety in a comprehensive way." 2 16 The Historical court therefore
protects only reasonable
concluded that the "Fourth Amendment ...
expectations of privacy," and that the proper avenue of recourse for those
desiring reform of the SCA "is in the market or the political process. 2 17 Thus,
in upholding the validity of § 2703(d) of the SCA, the Fifth Circuit approved
the practice of law enforcement obtaining warrants for historical CSLI upon a
showing of reasonable suspicion, even though the Fourth Amendment requires
a higher standard-probable cause.
C.

The Eleventh Circuit: Davis

In 2014, in United States v. Davis, the Eleventh Circuit created a split
by diverging from the decisions of the Third Circuit in Provider and the Fifth
2 18
Davis arose when a criminal defendant appealed his
Circuit in Historical.
conviction because it was secured, in part, by the government's use at trial of
CSLI that it obtained pursuant to the SCA.219 On appeal, Davis principally
alleged that the district court's admission of his CSLI pursuant to the SCA
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 2 20 The Eleventh Circuit panel agreed,
holding that § 2703(d)'s reasonable suspicion warrants violate the Fourth
Amendment.22 1 Applying the "good faith"222 exception to the Fourth

212

Id.

213

Id.

Id. at 615.
Id. at 614-15.
216
Id at 614 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring)).
217
Id. at 615.
218
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1213 (11th Cir.), vacated, 573 F. App'x 925 (11th
2014),
aff'don reh'g, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).
Cir.
219
Id. at 1210-11.
214
215

220

Id. at 1210.

221

Id. at 1217.
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the Davis court

nevertheless

943

upheld

Davis's

1. The Majority Opinion
Following the Eleventh Circuit's Davis panel decision, both the
government and Davis filed motions for rehearing en banc.2 24 The
government's motion was granted and the panel's ruling was thereby
vacated.225 Then, in May 2015, the Eleventh Circuit ruled nine to two that the
government's warrantless acquisition of historical CSLI pursuant to the SCA is
constitutional.226 Thus, the federal circuit split created by the Davis panel
decision was erased by the Eleventh Circuit's en banc Davis decision.
In affirming the constitutionality of the SCA, the Eleventh Circuit
remarked that although the evidentiary standard of the SCA falls below the
probable cause mandate of the Fourth Amendment, the SCA nevertheless
contains privacy safeguards 227 more strenuous than those required of the
government to issue subpoenas compelling third-party production of other
business records.228 Davis nevertheless contended that the court order
compelling production of his historic CSLI records violated his Fourth
Amendment rights, as the order was supported by reasonable suspicion rather

222
Id. The "good faith" exception to the typical exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment,
established in United States v. Leon, dictates that evidence of a government search or seizure
should not be suppressed unless the officer knew, or should have known, that the search or
seizure was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The Davis court
concluded that "[a]t that time, there was no governing authority affecting the constitutionality of
this application of the [SCA]. There is not even [an] allegation that any actor in the process
evidenced anything other than good faith." Davis, 754 F.3d at 1218.
223
Davis, 754 F.3d at 1218.
224
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 505 (11th Cir. 2015).
225
Id.
226
See id at 500.
227
Id. at 505-06 (noting that (1) the SCA demands that specific and articulable facts
demonstrating that there are reasonable grounds to believe the requested information is relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation; (2) the SCA exceeds the constitutional requirements for
compulsory subpoenas; (3) judicial review by a magistrate is a pre-condition to § 2703(d) order
issuance; (4) the SCA prohibits cell phone service providers from voluntarily providing CSLI to
government entities; and (5) the SCA provides remedies and penalties-including monetary
penalties and disciplinary proceedings against the offending federal officers-for violations of
the anti-disclosure privacy provisions).
228
Id. at 506 (noting that subpoenas are routinely used to compel production of such business
records as credit card statements, bank statements, hotel bills, purchase orders, and billing
invoices).
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than probable cause.2 29 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit began Davis with a
review of applicable Fourth Amendment precedent.2 30
Summarizing the jurisprudence set forth in Katz, Smith, Miller, and
Historical, the Eleventh Circuit turned to the particular facts of Davis's case.231
First, the court concluded that they were not his to withhold.232 Rather, Davis's
CSLI records neither contained the contents of Davis's private
communications, nor were they owned or possessed by Davis.23 3 Thus, because
Davis's cell phone service provider maintained his CSLI records in the
ordinary course of business for legitimate business purposes, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that Davis's CSLI records were the business records and
property of his service provider.2 34
The Davis court also determined that, assuming Davis had ownership
or possessory rights in his historical CSLI, he had neither a subjective nor
objective expectation of privacy in such records, likening Davis to the bank
customer in Miller and the phone customer in Smith.235 Specifically, Davis was
found to have no subjective expectation of privacy because, as a cell phone
user, he knew that (1) he must transmit signals to nearby cell towers, (2)
making or receiving calls necessarily conveys his general location to his cell
phone provider, and (3) cell phone companies record such usage.23 6 Likewise,
the Eleventh Circuit determined that whatever subjective expectation of privacy
Davis might have had, it was objectively unreasonable because, under Smith,
cell phone users are presumed to know of "uncontroverted and publicly
available facts about technologies and practices" applied by phone
companies.23 ' The Eleventh Circuit was also unpersuaded that advances in
technology enabling the determination of a cell phone's location alter the
Fourth Amendment calculus established in Smith.238 Rather, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the landlines at issue in Smith were arguably even more
revealing than modem, imprecise CSLI because landlines correspond to fixed

229

Id.

230

Id. at 506-11.

Id. at 507-11.
Id. at 511 (deciding that "non-content evidence, lawfully created by a third-party telephone
company for legitimate business purposes does not belong to Davis, even if it concerns him").
231

232

233

Id.

234

Id.

235

Id.

Id. at 510 (citing In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724
F.3d 600,
613-14 (5th Cir. 2013)). "Users are aware that cell phones do not work when they are outside the
range of the provider company's cell tower network." Id.
237
Id. at 511 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979)).
236

238

Id
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physical addresses. 2 39 The Eleventh Circuit therefore reasoned that there is no
reason to deviate from "the longstanding third-party doctrine [set forth in
Smith, which] plainly controls the disposition of this case." 24 0
The Eleventh Circuit then directly addressed Davis's principal
argument that United States v. Jones, not Smith and Miller, controlled the
adjudication of his appeal. 24 1 The argument gained little traction, however, as
the court declared that Jones turned on the government physically trespassing
by placing a GPS tracker on a private citizen's vehicle and, therefore, was
"wholly inapplicable" to the CSLI at issue in Davis's case.242 Additionally, the
Davis court found that historical CSLI is distinguishable from the "precise,
real-time GPS tracking in Jones" because CSLI "does not identify the cell
phone user's location with pinpoint precision" and, therefore, "does not paint
the 'intimate portrait of personal, social, religious, medical, and other activities
and interactions' that Davis claims." 243
The Eleventh Circuit also dismissed Davis's "intimate picture"
argument by noting that reasonable expectations of privacy do not turn on the
quantity of non-content information.2 44 The court reasoned that if Davis had no
expectation of privacy in his CSLI records, then a Fourth Amendment violation
could not occur when the government acquired them, regardless of the duration
of the CSLI records or whether those records created a mosaic of his
activities.245 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the "judicial system
does not engage in monitoring or a search when it compels the production of
preexisting documents from a witness." 24 6
Finally, the Davis court noted that the touchstone of Fourth
Amendment analysis is reasonableness and, therefore, examined, arguendo, the
reasonableness of the government's acquisition of Davis's CSLI.247 The
Eleventh Circuit began its reasonableness inquiry by observing that the

239

Id. at 511-12.

240

Id. at 512.
Id. at 513.

241

See id. at 514 (stating that in Davis's case, the government obtained records from the cell
phone service provider without any physical intrusion on private property, and that such records
belonged to a private company, were obtained through a court order authorized by federal statute,
could be collected as the result of private action-the construction of the service provider's cell
towers-and were collected for legitimate business purposes).
243
Id. at 515. The court conceded, however, that close analysis of Davis's CSLI for the 67day period the government obtained could reveal patterns with regard to his physical location. Id.
However, the Eleventh Circuit still found that 67 days of CSLI does not yield "anything close to
the 'intimate portrait' of Davis's life that he now argues." Id. at 516.
244
Id at 515.
242

245

Id.

246

Id. at 516.
Id. at 516-18.

247
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Supreme Court applies a strong presumption of constitutionality to an act of
Congress, especially when the act turns on what is reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.24 8 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged,
however, that despite the favorable presumption congressional legislation
enjoys, reasonableness of a search or seizure is ultimately based "on the one
hand, [by] the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." 2 4 9
In balancing such competing interests, the Eleventh Circuit first
addressed and rejected any claim that Davis possessed a privacy interest in his
CSLI.25 0 The court reiterated that Davis had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his CSLI records, as they were his service provider's business
records. 2 5 1 The Eleventh Circuit next reasoned that to whatever extent Davis
did have a privacy expectation in his CSLI, it was negligibly intruded by the
252
government.
Not only were none of Davis's conversations recorded, he was
not tracked real-time with GPS.253 Moreover, Davis's liberties were protected
by the SCA's requirement that a neutral and detached magistrate be presented
with specific and articulable facts that the sought CSLI be material and
reasonably relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. 2 54 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit found that "any intrusion on Davis's alleged privacy expectation ...
was minimal."25 5
The Eleventh Circuit next considered the interests of the government in
obtaining CSLI in criminal investigations.2 56 The court observed that historical
CSLI "serve[s] compelling governmental interests" in many criminal cases
because they are "routinely used to investigate the full gamut of state and
federal crimes, including child abductions, bombings, kidnappings, murders,
robberies, sex offenses, and terrorism-related offenses."257 Additionally, the
Eleventh Circuit recognized that CSLI is valuable to law enforcement during
the early stages of investigations to "help build probable cause against the
guilty, deflect suspicion from the innocent, aid in the search for truth, and
judiciously allocate scarce investigative resources., 25 8

248
249
250
251

Id. at 516-17 (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976)).
Id. at 517 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
Id
Id

252

Id

253

Id

254

Id.

255

Id.

256

See id. at 518.

257

Id.

258

Id
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In its summation, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "Davis had at
most a diminished expectation of privacy" in his historical CSLI; production of
his CSLI was not "a serious invasion of any such privacy interest"; the
disclosure of CSLI pursuant to a § 2703(d) order "served substantial
governmental interests"; and, therefore, a "strong presumption of
constitutionality" applied to his case. 25 9 Thus, in its en banc Davis decision, the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Third and Fifth Circuits, declaring that §
2703(d) of the SCA "comports with applicable Fourth Amendment principles
and is not constitutionally unreasonable," despite not satisfying the probable
cause requirement of the Warrant Clause.260
2. The Pryor Concurrence 26 1
Despite joining the majority opinion in full, Judge William Pryor wrote
separately to argue that strict application of the third-party doctrine demands
that a court order compelling disclosure of CSLI would not violate a person's
Fourth Amendment rights, even if the protections of the SCA did not exist.262
Because a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily discloses to third-parties, and because "[t]here is no doubt that
Davis voluntarily disclosed his location to a third party by using a cell phone to
place or receive calls," Judge Pryor declared that "this appeal is easy." 2 63
Comparing Davis's appeal to the facts of Smith and Miller, Judge Pryor
saw no distinction between the records of dialed numbers created through the
use of landlines in Smith and the records of historical CSLI created through the
use of cell phones.2 64 Judge Pryor dismissed the argument that CSLI is created
less voluntarily than records of dialed numbers simply because the latter
involves affirmative action. 26 5 "[I]n neither case is a phone user coerced to
reveal anything." 266 If a telephone user wishes not to reveal the numbers he
dials to the telephone company, "he has another option: don't place a call."2 67
Likewise, if a cell phone user wishes not to reveal his physical movements to
his cellular carrier, he has "another option: turn off the cell phone." 26 8

259
260

id.
Id.

Judge William Pryor filed a concurrence, not to be confused with Judge Jill Pryor who
joined the Davis dissent.
262
Davis, 785 F.3d at 519 (Pryor, J., concurring).
261

263

Id.

264

Id.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id.
Id

265
266
267
268
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Moreover, Judge Pryor found Davis's disclosure of his location to his
cell phone provider was "no less 'knowing' than the disclosure at issue in
Smith." 269 In Smith, the Supreme Court ruled that telephone users know they
convey phone numbers to the telephone company because it is through the
telephone company's switching equipment that calls are completed.270
Similarly, Judge Pryor found that although "most people may be oblivious to
the 'esoteric functions' of a technology," it cannot be believed that "cell phone
users lack 'some awareness' that they communicate information about their
location to cell towers." 2 7 1 Therefore, Judge Pryor concluded that the thirdparty rule of Smith defeats Davis's appeal, irrespective of the SCA and its
reasonable suspicion warrants.272
Judge Pryor also cautioned that even if the rapid advancement of
technology implicates proper interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the
courts must exercise restraint because Congress, not the judiciar , has the
ability to adequately address complex and evolving technologies. 2 3 "Simply
put, we must apply the law and leave the task of developing new rules for
rapidly changing technologes to the branch most capable of weighing the costs
and benefits of doing so." 2 4
Finally, Judge Pryor commented that the Eleventh Circuit, as an inferior
court, has "no business ... anticipating the future decisions of the Supreme
Court." 2 75 "If the third-party doctrine results in an unacceptable 'slippery

slope,' the Supreme Court can tell us as much." 276 Thus, if such decisions as
Jones have "given reasons to doubt the rule's breadth," Judge Pryor concluded
that the Supreme Court "alone must decide the exceptions to its rule."277
3.

The Jordan Concurrence 2 78

Adopting a more circumspect approach, Judge Adalberto Jordan
predicted that Davis's case would be not only about the present, "but . . . also

potentially about the future." 27 9 Judge Jordan remarked that as technology
becomes more sophisticated, CSLI "will undoubtedly become more precise and

269
270
271
272
273
274

Id.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979)).
Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 742) (citations omitted).
See id at 519.
See id. at 520.
Id.

275

Id. at 521.

276

Id. (citations omitted).

277

Id.

278

Judge Wilson joined Judge Jordan's concurrence.
Davis, 785 F.3d at 521 (Jordan, J., concurring).

279
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easier to obtain, and if there is no expectation of privacy here, I have some
concerns about the government being able to conduct 24/7 electronic tracking
(live or historical) in the years to come without an appropriate judicial
order." 28 0 As a result, Judge Jordan contended that the Eleventh Circuit should
decide Davis on reasonableness grounds and leave broader expectation of
privacy issues for another case. 2 8 1 The Supreme Court did so in City of Ontario
v. Quon 2 82 when it simply assumed that a police officer had a privacy
expectation in text messages he sent from his city-issued pager, despite those
messages being routed through a third-party service provider.283 Accordingly,
Judge Jordan assumed that Davis had a diminished expectation of privacy in his
CSLI, but found that the government nevertheless satisfied the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirements by using § 2703(d) of the SCA to
obtain such records.284
Judge Jordan contended that the third-party doctrine diminished
whatever privacy expectation Davis had in his CSLI, and that in such cases
warrantless searches and seizures may still satisfy the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.28 In Davis's case, Judge Jordan
determined that whatever search occurred when the government obtained
Davis's CSLI, it was reasonable, first, because the protocol of the SCA was
followed, and second, because "temporal scope of the [CSLI] request ... was
reasonable." 2 86 The government only requested a period spanning from six days
before the first robbery to six days after the last robbery in order to determine
Davis's location at the time of the robberies and whether and to what extent he
communicated with the other suspects.2 87 Finally, Judge Jordan noted that there
was no passive tracking in Davis that occurred by virtue of Davis simply
carrying a cell phone; the CSLI used against him at trial contained solely the
calls he placed or received.288 Thus, Judge Jordan concluded the government's
use of § 2703(d) of the SCA to obtain Davis's CSLI was constitutionally
reasonable.2 89

280

Id. (citations omitted).

281

See id.

282

560 U.S. 746, 759-60 (2010).
See Davis, 785 F.3d at 521-22 (citing Quon, 560 U.S. at 759-60).

283
284

Id.

285

Id. at 522-23 (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013)).
Id. at 524.

286
287

Id.

288

Id.

289

See id. at 522.
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4. The Rosenbaum Concurrence
Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum, while concurring in the judgment of the
Eleventh Circuit, wrote separately to give additional discussion to the thirdparty doctrine in the context of modern technology because "unless a person is
willing to live 'off the grid,' it is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing the most
personal of information to third-party service providers on a constant basis, just
to navigate daily life."29 0 Judge Rosenbaum continued, "the thought that the
government should be able to access such information without the basic
protection that a warrant offers is nothing less than chilling." 2 9 1 Recalling the
"problem" identified by Justice Marshall in his Smith dissent, Judge
Rosenbaum reminded the Eleventh Circuit that the third-party doctrine forces
"a person ... to forgo use of what for many years has become a personal or
professional necessity, . . . [or] accept the risk of surveillance." 2 92 Despite her
reservations regarding the practical effect of third-party doctrine, Judge
Rosenbaum joined the majority opinion of the Eleventh Circuit because "we
are not the Supreme Court and . . we must apply the third-party doctrine
where appropriate." 2 93
Judge Rosenbaum deemed that the third-party doctrine was appropriate
in Davis because there is no specific historically protected privacy interest
analogous to CSLI, and because the privacy interest implicated by CSLI "is
materially indistinguishable" from the privacy interests at issue in Smith.294
Therefore, Judge Rosenbaum concluded that Smith must govern the case and
the Eleventh Circuit's approval of the § 2703(d) order compelling disclosure of
Davis's CSLI could not be avoided.2 95 Finally, Judge Rosenbaum's
concurrence concluded with the forewarning that if historically protected
privacy interests are subordinated by courts to the third-party doctrine, "then
with every new technology, we [will] surrender more and more of our
historically protected Fourth Amendment interests to unreasonable searches
and seizures." 29 6

290
291
292
293
294

Id. at 524-25 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
Id. at 525.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
Id.
Id. at 531-32.

295

Id. at 531.

296

Id. at 532-33.
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The Dissent

Judge Beverly B. Martin, with Judge Jill Pryor joining, filed the dissent
to the Eleventh Circuit's en banc Davis opinion.2 97 Challenging the majority's
position that the third-party doctrine is dispositive of the case, Judge Martin
indicated that her "reading of Supreme Court precedent suggests that things are
not so simple."29 8 Rather, Judge Martin maintained that the Fourth Amendment
prohibits the government from subjecting the citizenry "to constant location
a warrant" supported by probable
tracking of their cell phones without ...
cause.299

First, Judge Martin contended that not only was the third-party doctrine
formulated nearly 40 years ago in the context of manually dialed phone
numbers and bank records, but also that dialed numbers are "readily
distinguishable" from the precedent of Smith.3 0 0 Judge Martin argued that Smith
turned on the idea that phone users voluntarily convey the numbers they dial by
affirmatively entering a desired number when placing a call, whereas cell
phone users do not affirmatively enter their location in order to place a call, and
therefore do not voluntarily disclose their CSLI. 30 ' Additionally, Judge Martin
asserted that the majority's emphasis on Smith was misguided because in that
case phone users were "required ... to recite phone numbers out loud to a
phone operator in order to make a call," and therefore knew that they conveyed
numerical information to the phone company.302 Conversely, there is no similar
"knowing" disclosure of CSLI because cell phone users have never had to
provide their location in order to place a call. 3 3 Thus, Judge Martin concluded
that Smith does not control Davis. 304
Second, Judge Martin noted that although the third-party doctrine
appears to allow government access to "all information that any third-party
obtains," Supreme Court precedent has given reasons to "doubt the rule's
breadth." 3 05 As evidence, Judge Martin called the Eleventh Circuit's attention
to a number of contexts in which the Supreme Court found a privacy right in
information despite its disclosure to third-parties, including the results of
diagnostic medical tests, 30 6 letters and other sealed packages, 307 and hotel

297

Id. at 533 (Martin, J., dissenting).

298

299

Id.
Id. at 544.

300

Id at 534.

301

Id.

302

Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)).
Id. at 534-35.

303
304

Id. at 535.

305

Id.

306

Id. (citing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001)).
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rooms. 3 08 Judge Martin conceded that such contexts are distinguishable from

Davis, but argued that they no less demonstrate that "the third-party doctrine
may not be as all-encompassing as the majority seems to believe."3 0 9
Third, Judge Martin determined that the majority's "blunt application"
of the third-party doctrine "threatens to allow government access to a
staggering amount of information that surely must be protected under the
Fourth Amendment," such as our e-mail accounts and online browsing
history.3 10 Judge Martin argued that the majority's application of the third-party
doctrine would result in the absolute forfeiture of any privacy interest in,
among other things, our search-engine history, what we watch online, whom
we "friend," what we buy, what we research, and whom we date, simply
because such records are necessarily routed through and maintained by third
parties for legitimate business purposes.31 1 Judge Martin posited that the
''enormous impact of this outcome is probably why at least one Circuit has held
that a person's Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the government
compels an internet service provider to turn over the contents of e-mails
without a warrant." 3 12 If e-mails are protected despite their being surrendered to
the control of a third party, then the third-party doctrine has its limits, Judge
Martin reasoned.3 13
Fourth, Judge Martin criticized the majority's distinction between
"content" and "non-content" data as being without a "coherent definition of the
terms."314 Moreover, Judge Martin recalled that even if a rational distinction
between the two varieties of information can be drawn, at oral argument the
government conceded that the majority's conception of the third-party doctrine
would permit its acquisition of such records as the sender and recipient of emails, the time e-mails are sent, the number of e-mails a person sends, the
websites a person visits, and "maybe even the connections a person
communicates with on a dating website and whom she meets in person-all
without a warrant."3 15

Judge Martin next suggested the Supreme Court has "insisted" that
technological advances require the judiciary to sometimes reconsider the scope
of "decades-old Fourth Amendment rules," because a "wooden application" of
the third-party doctrine would result in a slippery slope in such information

307

Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984)).

30s

Id. (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487-88, 490 (1964)).

309

Id

310

312

Id. at 535-37.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 536.

3

Id. at 537.

314

Id
Id

311

315

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss2/11

34

Boyce: The Stored Communications Act: Property Law Enforcement Tool or I
THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

2015]

953

(

technology contexts as CSLI.316 As evidence, Judge Martin cited Riley v.
1
in which the Supreme Court decided the continued vitality of its
California,"
which previously
41-year-old decision in United States v. Robinson,1
governed the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Although "mechanical application of Robinson might well support the
warrantless searches at issue," Judge Martin noted that the Riley Court
nonetheless unanimously rejected Robinson, recognizing that "cell phones are
based on technology nearly inconceivable" when Robinson was decided.32
Similarly, Judge Martin contended that the third-party doctrine is outdated
because the degree with which individuals convey information to third-parties
has increased by "orders of magnitude" since Smith and Miller.32 1 Judge Martin
observed that society's deep reliance on third-party technology providers
enables, as in Davis, the government to obtain months of "near-constant"
CSLI-a "technological feat impossible to imagine" when the Supreme Court
decided Smith and Miller.322
Fifth, and finally, Judge Martin rejected the majority's reliance on the
third-party doctrine to uphold the SCA's constitutionality and instead analyzed
Davis employing the traditional objective and subjective expectation of privacy
tests set forth in Katz. 32 3 Judge Martin declared that, "the answer to the
subjective inquiry is easy" because individuals do not expect "the government
to track them" because they use "what amounts to a basic necessity of twentyfirst century life-the cell phone."324 Conversely, Judge Martin determined that
the "more difficult question" is whether Davis's expectation of privacy was one
society recognizes as objectively reasonable. 3 25 Applying the opinions of five
Justices in Jones-which established that long-term location monitoring
generally violates reasonable expectations of privacy-Judge Martin
determined that Davis's subjective expectation of privacy in the amount of
CSLI the government used against him at trial was likely one society would
recognize as objectively reasonable.3 26 Judge Martin thus concluded that
because the 67 days of CSLI collected in Davis more than doubled the 28 days
of tracking that five Justices decided was unconstitutionally long-term in

316

3

Id
134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).

318

414 U.S. 218 (1973).

319

Davis, 785 F.3d at 537 (Martin, J., dissenting).
Id (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484, 2488-89).
Id. at 538.

320

321
322

323

Id
Id

324

Id. at 538-39.

325

Id. at 539.
Id at 539-41.

326
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2703(d) reasonable suspicion

D. The Fourth Circuit: Graham
Exactly three months after an en banc Eleventh Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the reasonable suspicion warrants of § 2703(d) of the
SCA-which eliminated the federal circuit split on the issue-in August 2015
the split was revived by the Fourth Circuit's panel decision in United States v.
Graham.32 9 In Graham, a panel of Fourth Circuit judges considered the appeal
of two criminal defendants challenging the constitutionality of the district
court's admission at trial of 221 days of their CSLI.330 Specifically, Graham
and his co-defendant33 1 challenged the district court's denial of their motion to
suppress their historical CSLI, arguing that the government's acquisition of
such records without a warrant supported by probable cause was an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 332 The Fourth
Circuit panel agreed, resurrecting the federal circuit split on the
constitutionality of § 2703(d) of the SCA.
On October 28, 2015, however, the Graham panel decision was vacated
when the Fourth Circuit granted the government's petition to rehear the case en
banc.33 Thus, presently, the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits affirm the
constitutionality of the SCA's reasonable suspicion warrants, and the en banc
Fourth Circuit is determining whether to accept or reject them. Though
nullified, the Graham panel decision remains valuable to the extant discussion
of the SCA's constitutionality and will therefore be examined below.

See id. at 540.
328
See id. at 544-45.
329
796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted,Nos. 12-4659(L), 12-4825, 2015 WL
6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015).
330
Id. at 338.
331
For ease of readability, hereinafter this Note will refer solely to Graham, rather than to
Graham and his co-defendant.
327

Graham, 796 F.3d at 342-43.
332
3
796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, Nos. 12-4659(L), 12-4825, 2015 WL
6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015).
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The Majority Opinion 3 34
i.

Fourth Amendment Introduction

First, after detailing the particular facts of Graham's underlying case, the
Fourth Circuit delivered a brief review of essential Fourth Amendment
principles.335 The court recalled that the Fourth Amendment protects persons
from unreasonable searches and seizures 336 and that Fourth Amendment
searches occur where the government invades a matter in which a person
possesses a subjective expectation of privacy that society is willing to
recognize as objectively reasonable.m A person's subjective expectation of
privacy is objectively reasonable, the court explained, when it is derived from
"understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." 33 8 Finally, the
Fourth Circuit concluded by mentioning that, absent a few specific exceptions,
warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.33 9
ii.

Cell Phone PrivacyAgreements

Second, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's determination that
Graham lacked a subjective expectation of privacy in his CSLI because he
waived it by agreeing to his service provider's privacy policy. 34 0 Rather, the
Graham court demonstrated that although Graham's service provider's privacy
policy indicated that his CSLI would be collected, there was no disclosure of
the fact that Graham's CSLI would be disclosed to the government or any other
third-party. 34' Furthermore, the court noted that recent studies show users of
electronic communications services frequently "do not read or understand their

334
Judge Thacker also filed a concurrence to the majority opinion in which she expressed
generalized "concern about the erosion of privacy in this era of rapid technological
development." Id. at 377 (Thacker, J., concurring). Judge Thacker cautioned that as
"technological progress continues to advance upon our zone of privacy, each step forward should
be met with considered judgment that errs on the side of protecting privacy and accounts for the
practical realities of modern life." Id. at 378. Finally, Judge Thacker praised the majority's
decision as one that "continues a time-honored American tradition-obtaining a warrant is the
rule, not the exception." Id.
335
Id. at 345 (majority opinion).
336
Id. at 344 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).

340

Id. (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1988)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 241-42 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Id. at 345.

341

Id.

33
338

339
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providers' privacy policies."3 42 The Fourth Circuit therefore concluded that the
district court erroneously decided that Graham either read or understood his
cell phone service provider's privacy policy. 3 43

iii. FourthAmendment Case Review
Third, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court has
recognized an individual's privacy interest in comprehensive accounts of the
movements of both her person and her personal property within private spaces,
particularly when such information may be gleaned only through technological
means not in use by the general public. 3 44 To support that conclusion, the
Graham court then analyzed the major cases applicable to the issue of whether
CSLI is constitutionally protected.345
Turning first to United States v. Karo,346 the Fourth Circuit noted that
law enforcement's surreptitious use of a radio transmitter to track a container
within a private residence violated the Fourth Amendment rights of those
persons with a justifiable privacy interest in the home.3 47 Such invasive,
warrantless tracking was deemed unconstitutional because the government
could not have otherwise learned whether an item "is actually located at a
particular time in [a] private residence" or whether it is in the possession "of
the person or persons whose residence is being watched."3 4 8 Next summarizing
Kyllo v.

United States, 3 4 9 the Fourth Circuit observed that warrantless

government use of technology not in general public use to explore a home's
interior to a degree previously unknowable without physical intrusion is a
presumptively unreasonable Fourth Amendment search.350
Despite their general relevance to Graham, the Fourth Circuit found
reason to distinguish Karo and Kyllo."' Unlike a cell phone, the Graham court
reasoned, the tracking device in Karo was not carried on anyone's person and

342

Id. (citing FED. TRADE

THROUGH TRANSPARENCY

COMM'N, MOBILE

PRIVACY DISCLOSURES:

BUILDING

TRUST

10 (Feb. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/

reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-federa-tradecommission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf; Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith
Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 543, 544
(2008)).
343
Id
344
Id
345

Id. at 345-50.

346

468 U.S. 705 (1984).
Graham, 796 F.3d at 346 (citing Karo, 468 U.S. at 709-10, 714-15).

347
348

Id

349
350

533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Graham,796 F.3d at 346 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40).

3s1

Id. at 347.
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therefore could not track anyone's location.352 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit
noted that Graham's CSLI records used against him at trial covered a 221-day
period, potentially placing him at home on dozens of specific occasions, far
more than the single intrusions of Karo and Kyllo. 3 53 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that long-term inspection of CSLI invades a greater Fourth
Amendment privacy interest than the searches challenged in both Karo and
Kyllo. 354

The Fourth Circuit then addressed United States v. Jones 35 5-and its
underlying case, United States v. Maynard3 5 -the most recent Supreme Court
case pertaining directly to long-term electronic location surveillance.357 In
Jones, five Justices applied the traditional two-pronged reasonable expectation
of privacy test of Katz to the government's warrantless GPS tracking of a
vehicle over a 28-day period, holding that the surveillance impinged on Jones's
reasonable expectation of privacy.35 8 Despite acknowledging that Jones left
unresolved how long government surveillance must occur before the
protections of the Fourth Amendment are triggered, the Graham court observed
that Justice Sotomayor's Jones concurrence expressed concerns about the
implications of the government's ability to aggregate an individual's location
information. 35 9 Specifically, Justice Sotomayor realized that such ability
enables authorities to ascertain "more or less at will," many private, and
presumably constitutionally protected, facts about a person's life. 60
The Graham court concluded that the privacy interests associated with
the long-term GPS tracking in Jones apply "with equal or greater force to
historical CSLI for an extended time period," because both long-term GPS
monitoring and long-term CSLI monitoring can reveal "a comprehensive view
and specific details of [an] individual's daily life." 36 Moreover, the Fourth
Circuit remarked that long-term monitoring of CSLI has the potential to be far
more invasive than the Jones GPS monitoring because a cell phone, unlike an
automobile, is not limited to traveling on roadways.36 2 Rather, a cell phone is a
small, hand-held device that seldom leaves its owner's possession and

352

Id.

3

Id. (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30; Karo, 468 U.S. at 709, 714).

354

Id

355

3

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Graham, 796 F.3d at 347.

3s

Id

356

Id. at 347-48 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56).
360
Id (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56) (noting that such tracking capability allows law
enforcement to discern one's "political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on").
359

361

Id. at 348.

362

Id.
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frequently enters private locations.6 Thus, the Fourth Circuit determined that
CSLI "can permit the government to track a person's movements between
public and private spaces, impacting at once her interests in both the privacy of
her movements and the privacy of her home."0
Next, the Fourth Circuit cited numerous state and federal district court
cases recognizing as objectively reasonable cell phone users' expectation of
privacy in their long-term CSLI, commenting that "it is not surprising" so many
courts have done so. 36 5 However, not only inferior courts, the court continued,
have recognized a privacy expectation in CSLI. 3 66 In Riley v. California -a
case regarding the warrantless inspection of a cell phone confiscated by law
enforcement following a search incident to a lawful arrest-the Supreme Court
cited "' [h]istoric location information' as among the heightened privacy
concerns presented in government inspection of cell phones, as such
information details the user's 'specific movements down to the minute, not
only around town but also within a particular building.' 36 8 Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit held that, taken together, Karo, Kyllo, Jones, and Riley support
the conclusion that the government invades a reasonable expectation of privacy
when it utilizes technology not in general use to discover the movements of an
individual over an extended period of time. 369 The Fourth Circuit thus ruled that
the government engages in a Fourth Amendment search when it seeks to
examine historical CSLI records pertaining to an extended period of time like
14370 or 221 days.3 7

363

364

Id.
Id.

Id. at 349 ("[Commonwealth v.] Augustine, 4 N.E.3d [846,] 865-66 [(Mass. 2014)]
(reasonable expectation of privacy in location information shown in historical CSLI records);
[State v.] Earls, 70 A.3d [630,] 632 [(N.J. 2013)] (reasonable expectation of privacy in location
of cell phones); Tracey v. State, 152 So.3d 504, 526 (Fla. 2014) (objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in 'location as signaled by one's cell phone'); In re Application of U.S. for
an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d
526, 539 (D. Md. 2011) ('reasonable expectation of privacy both in [subject's] location as
revealed by real-time [CSLI] and in his movement where his location is subject to continuous
tracking over an extended period of time, here thirty days.'); In re Application of U.S. for an
Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info. (In re Application (E.D.N.Y.)), 809 F.
Supp. 2d 113, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ('reasonable expectation of privacy in long-term cell-location
records')." (emphasis added)).
365

366

Id.

367

134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
Graham, 796 F.3d at 349 (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490).

368
369

Id

370
See id. at 344 (explaining that two § 2703(d) orders were obtained by the government; the
first order directed Sprint/Nextel to provide CSLI records for a total of 14 days, and the second
order compelled production of 221 days of CSLI that included the previously-obtained 14-day
span of records).
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iv. CSLI Contemporaneousnessand Precision

Fourth, the Fourth Circuit rejected as "constitutionally insignificant" the
district court's distinction between Graham and Karo and Jones on the basis
that the surveillance in those cases was continuous and real-time, whereas
Graham's CSLI was historical and intermittent.3 72 The Graham court observed
that the government was unable to know before obtaining Graham's CSLI
records how voluminous and detailed they would be.373 Consequently, prior to
obtaining a § 2703(d) order compelling production of Graham's CSLI by his
service provider for the desired period, it would be impossible for the
government to know whether no records existed, or whether, as was the actual
case, Graham's CSLI would reveal "an impressive 29,659 location data points"
amounting to an average of well over 100 daily location data points.
The
court concluded that examination of such extensive CSLI records provided the
government with a "reasonably detailed account" of Graham's movements-in
public locations as well as the home-during the obtained 221-day time
period. 3 75 The Fourth Circuit therefore rejected the district court's suggestion
that Graham's CSLI was insufficiently continuous to raise Fourth Amendment
376
privacy concerns.
Next the Fourth Circuit countered the district court's conclusion that
Graham's CSLI only revealed the general vicinity of his cell phone, and was
insufficiently precise to invade his reasonable expectation of privacy.377 The
Graham court noted that although the precision of CSLI partly depends on size
and coverage areas of cell phone service, there is "intense competition"37
among providers to eliminate gaps in coverage and increase CSLI precision,
and Kyllo requires the court to consider such advancements when determining

Id. at 350. In so ruling, the court recognized, but dismissed, the argument that CSLI may
not be revealing because a cell phone may not be powered on or connecting with nearby towers.
Id. at 349-50. Rather, the "government cannot know in advance of obtaining this information
how revealing it will be or whether it will detail the cell phone user's movements in private
spaces." Id. at 350 (citing State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 642 (N.J. 2013)).
372
Id.
371

37

Id.

374

Id

37

Id.

376

Id.

3

Id.
Id. at 350-51 (noting that service providers have "begun to increase network capacity and
to fill gaps in network coverage by installing low-power cells such as 'microcells' and
'femtocells,' which cover areas as small as 40 feet").
378
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the typical capability of a technology. 37 9 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
assessed the precision of Graham's CSLI and decided that it was exact enough
to provide at least "reasonable inferences" about his locations at specific points
in time.380 The court reasoned that Graham's CSLI would not have been relied
upon if it were not sufficiently precise to establish his whereabouts.3 81 The
court also foreclosed any argument that Graham's CSLI is constitutionally too
imprecise to be considered a Fourth Amendment search because examination of
his CSLI may require the drawing of inferences to glean his exact location at
particular times.3 "Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Kyllo, specifically rejected
'the novel proposition that inference insulates a search"' from constitutional
scrutiny. 8 The Fourth Circuit thus rejected the district court's argument that
Graham's CSLI was insufficiently precise to infringe upon his expectations of
privacy in his locations and
movements. 384
v.

Third-PartyDoctrine

Fifth, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the conclusion of the dissent and
the district court that Graham lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
CSLI because his cell phone service provider maintained them in the ordinary
course of business.3 8 ' Rather, to the Graham court, it was clear that "cell phone
users do not voluntarily convey their CSLI to their service providers. The thirdparty doctrine of Miller3 86 and Smith 38 7 is therefore inapplicable here."

88

The Fourth Circuit began the third-party doctrine portion of the opinion
by briefly summarizing cases in which voluntary disclosure of information to
third-parties was held to constitute abandonment of privacy in the exposed
information: Smith, Miller, and a similar Fourth Circuit case, United States v.
Bynum, 3 89 in which a website user was deemed to have no expectation of
privacy in his account information. 39 0 However, the court distinguished those

Id. ("While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt
379
must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development."
(quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001))).
380
Id. at 351.
381

Id.

382

Id

383

Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36) (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).

384

Id.

385

Id.

386

United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

387
388
389
390

Graham, 796 F.3d at 352.
604 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2010).
Graham, 796 F.3d at 354.
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cases from Graham.39 1 In those cases, the Fourth Circuit held there was
voluntary conveyance of the information to a third-party, whereas in Graham
no such conveyance occurred because "a cell phone user does not 'convey'
CSLI to her service provider at all-voluntarily or otherwise-and therefore
does not assume any risk of disclosure to law enforcement." 392
Not only is CSLI automatically generated with or without the user's
participation, the court noted, a cell phone user never submits any location
information to complete a call.393 Moreover, the CSLI in Graham detailed not
only location information for outgoing communications, but also for incoming
communications-even messages or calls that went unanswered.39 4 The Fourth
Circuit therefore refused to "impute to a cell phone user the risk that
information about her location created by her service provider will be disclosed
to law enforcement when she herself has not actively disclosed this
information."395
The Fourth Circuit then directly addressed the contrary positions of the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits that general use of a cell phone demonstrates the
user's voluntary conveyance of CSLI, notwithstanding that cell phone users
"[do] not directly inform [their] service provider" of their whereabouts.396
Observing that cell phone use is ubiquitous in society and essential to full
cultural and economic participation for a growing segment of society, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that "[p]eople cannot be deemed to have volunteered to
forfeit expectations of privacy by simply seeking active participation in society
through use of their cell phones."397

Furthermore, the Graham court argued that, despite assertions of the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits to the contrary, CSLI records are not of the same
nature as those documents routinely stored by third-party businesses and
obtained by the government by subpoena. 9 Rather, the Fourth Circuit
classified CSLI records as "wholly unlike" other routine business recordssuch as credit card statements, hotel bills, and purchase orders-because the
latter require overt and voluntary transactions to create, whereas CSLI is thirdparty recording of the location of cell phone users regardless of whether the
user is an active and voluntary participant in the recording. 9

391

392

Id.
Id.

394

Id.
Id. at 355.

39

Id.

393

Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Application of the
U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2014)).
397
Id. at 356.
398
Id. at 356-57.
399
Id. at 357.
396
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The Fourth Circuit next agreed with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits that
a service provider's business interest in maintaining CSLI records is a relevant
consideration in determining whether a cell phone user can maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in such records. 4 00 However, the court noted
that business interests are not the only interests to be weighed.40 1 In addition to
properly considering real and personal property law concepts, courts must
consider the understandings recognized and permitted in society.402
Mentioning again that society recognizes an individual's interest in maintaining
privacy in her movements over an extended period as well as her movements in
private places, the Fourth Circuit held that an individual maintains such an
expectation in such records-even if a cell phone provider records and stores
them-so long as the cell phone user does actively participate in their
creation.403 To hold otherwise, the court noted, would permit the government to
"convert an individual's cell phone into a tracking device by examining the
massive bank of location information retained by her service provider, and to
do so without probable cause."404
Next the court commented that in the digital age courts routinely accord
Fourth Amendment protections to digital information the creator intends to
keep private but must route through third-parties. 4 0 5 For example, the Fourth
Circuit noted that the Fourth Amendment has been held to apply to the content
of e-mails, but not the e-mail address information used to transmit the emails. 4 0 6 The court distinguished CSLI from e-mail transmission data, however,
noting that "CSLI is of course more than simple routing information; it tracks a
cell phone user's location across specific points in time."40 7 Furthermore, there
is nothing a cell phone user can do to hide her location from her service
provider, whereas an e-mail drafter can take reasonable steps to maintain her
anonymity.40 8 Thus, in the absence of evidence that Graham or cell phone users
in general intend for CSLI to be open to inspection by others, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that a cell phone user's Fourth Amendment interest in CSLI is not
extinguished because CSLI is a tool used by third-parties to route
communications. 409

400
401

Id.
Id.

402

Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)).

403

Id
Id

404
405
406
407
408
409

Id at 358.
Id. (citing United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287-88 (6th Cir. 2010)).

Id.
Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 359.
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit discussed the inherent conflict between the
protections of the Fourth Amendment and the advancement of technology and
provided its approach to deciding such cases. 41 0 The court resolved that, "even
as technology evolves, protections against government intrusion should remain
consistent with those privacy expectations society deems reasonable." 4 H" And
although society's privacy expectations can change over time, the advent of
new technology alone is not a sufficient basis to infer an immediate and equally
dramatic shift in people's privacy expectations. 4 12 Moreover, "[t]he third-party
doctrine is intended to delimit Fourth Amendment protections where privacy
claims are not reasonable-not to diminish Fourth Amendment protections
where new technology provides new means for acquiring private
information.""4 3 The court rejected the temptation to apply the third-party
doctrine to Graham's case, noting that if the modem Fourth Amendment is to
be a "shrunken one," such a "solemn task" should be left to the "superiors in
the majestic building on First Street."4 14 Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that the
relatively new technology of CSLI, which facilitates the eased tracking of
individuals' movements, cannot by itself displace society's reasonable privacy
expectations, nor can it justify governmental inspection of CSLI records by the
government in absence of judicially-determined probable cause.415 With its
ruling in Graham, therefore, the Fourth Circuit declared that the reasonable
suspicion warrants of § 2703(d) of the SCA violate the Fourth Amendment.416
2. Motz Dissent
Judge Diana G. Motz filed a dissent to the Fourth Circuit's Graham
decision.4 17 Advocating judicial restraint, Judge Motz argued that the "wellestablished'"4 18 third-party doctrine must be followed by inferior courts until
overturned by the Supreme Court or revised by Congress or state legislatures,

410

Id. at 359-61.

411

Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 360.

412
413

Id at 361.
Id
416
Notwithstanding the fundamental holding of Graham, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
Graham's conviction by applying the "good-faith exception" to the Fourth Amendment to the
SCA. Id. at 361. "Prior to our ruling today, neither this Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court had
deemed the government's conduct in this case unconstitutional." Id. at 363. The Fourth Circuit
accordingly concluded that "the government reasonably relied on the SCA in exercising its
option to seek a § 2703(d) order rather than a warrant." Id
417
Id. at 378 (Motz, J., dissenting).
414
415

418

Id.
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despite the temptation to remedy perceived Fourth Amendment deficiencies
from the bench. 19
Applying the third-party doctrine to Graham, Judge Motz determined
that when Graham elected to use a cell phone he "unquestionably 'exposed"'
his CSLI to his cell phone service provider and thereby assumed the risk that
such records would be disclosed to the government. 4 20 Graham therefore lacked
any basis to assert an expectation of privacy in his CSLI. 4 2 1 Accordingly, the
government's acquisition of Graham's historical CSLI pursuant to § 2703(d)
orders rather than warrants did not violate the Fourth Amendment, Judge Motz
concluded.422
Finally, Judge Motz noted that although "[t]ime may show that [the
majority has] struck the proper balance between technology and privacy[,] . .
it will only be because the Supreme Court revises its decades-old understanding
of how the Fourth Amendment treats information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties."423 Judge Motz accordingly concluded that the Graham decision was
inappropriate because the majority "endeavor[ed] to beat the Supreme Court to
the punch."4 24

The next Part attempts to refute the prevailing federal appellate SCA
jurisprudence and argues that the proper interpretation of § 2703(d)'s
constitutionality is that of the Fourth Circuit: it violates the Fourth Amendment.
V. THE SCA CONTRADICTS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Section 2703(d) of the SCA violates the Fourth Amendment because
individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in CSLI, and thus the
government must first obtain a warrant supported by probable cause to access
CSLI. To support this assertion, this Part will argue that (1) the Founders would
likely have abhorred the nearly boundless nature of the SCA; (2) the SCA
violates both the Warrant and Probable Cause Clauses of the Fourth
Amendment; (3) cell phone users maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy
in CSLI, notwithstanding the third-party doctrine; and (4) the needs of law
enforcement do not justify warrantless access to CSLI.

419
Id. at 378, 388-89 (contending that the majority's decision "lacks support from all relevant
authority and places us in conflict with the Supreme Court" and that not only are "Congress and
state legislatures . . . far better positioned to respond to changes in technology than are the
courts," but also the "very statute at issue here, the Stored Communications Act (SCA),
demonstrates that Congress can-and does-make these judgments").
420
Id. at 380.
421
422

Id.
Id.

423

Id. at 390.

424

Id.
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Founders'Intent

Records of the Fourth Amendment's pre-ratification debate among the
Founders are sparse. 425 However, both an examination of history and an
application of common sense indicate that in passing the Fourth Amendment,
our forefathers could neither have anticipated nor approved of the massive
constitutional loophole created by the reasonable suspicion requirement of §
2703(d) of the SCA.426
Although the Founders appreciated the necessity of a powerful and
effective government, "they also feared what a powerful central government
might bring, not only to the jeopardy of the states but to the terror of the
individual." 4 27 The Founders "had known oppressive government," 4 28 in the
form of general warrants and writs of assistance, which gave British officers
carte blanche to search homes for evidence of criminal activity.429 Opposition
to the government's unbridled ability to probe into citizens' affairs not only
largely motivated the Fourth Amendment's passage 4 30 but "was in fact one of
the driving forces behind the Revolution itself."4 3 1
The SCA, which allows the government to track virtually every
American older than the age of 12, provides minimal judicial oversight and
offers nearly no legal recourse.43 2 The SCA is a modern permutation of the
general warrants the crafters of the Fourth Amendment abhorred.43 3
Accordingly, although the opinions of reasonable individuals may differ,
contemporary understanding of the Founders' intent in drafting and enacting
the protections of the Fourth Amendment strongly suggests that they would
vehemently oppose the government's boundless surveillance capabilities under
the SCA.434 Beyond the historical motivations of our forefathers, the language
of the Fourth Amendment itself demonstrates that the SCA is repugnant to the
Constitution. The following section demonstrates the irreconcilability of the
Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1047 (2011).
426
See Curtis, Gizzi & Kittleson, supra note 160, at 91 ("[I]t is hard to imagine that a nation
founded on the principles of liberty and freedom would countenance a society in which the precondition for participation in the social and business life of the nation is to give to the
government the ability to track your location at all times.").
425

427

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
AND

THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 54 (Cynthia Lee ed., 2011) [hereinafter THE FOURTH AMENDMENT].
428
429

Id. at 55.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014).

430

Id

431

Id

432

See Curtis, Gizzi & Kittleson, supra note 160, at 90.
See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
See, e.g., supra note 38-42 and accompanying text.

433
434
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SCA with the Fourth Amendment's guarantee that searches and seizures will be
authorized by warrants supported by probable cause.
B.

Warrant and ProbableCause Clauses

Not only is the SCA inconsistent with the Founders' ideas of privacy,
the SCA is unconstitutional because it violates both the Fourth Amendment's
Warrant and Probable Cause Clauses. The Fourth Amendment explicitly
mandates both that Americans are to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures and that no warrant shall be issued unless supported by probable
cause. 4 3 5 If, however, a warrant lacking probable cause is issued, any search or
seizure authorized by it is deemed warrantless, 436 and warrantless government
searches or seizures are per se unreasonable.4 37 The SCA attempts to legislate
around these Fourth Amendment guarantees by authorizing the issuance of
warrants supported by reasonable suspicion, and is therefore plainly
unconstitutional.43 8
The Constitution is the "supreme [f]aw of the [1]and,"4 39 and any
congressional legislation inconsistent with it is by definition unconstitutional.4
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution unequivocally requires that no
warrants shall issue but upon demonstration of probable cause.44 1 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has held, "[i]f times have changed, reducing everyman's
scope to do as he pleases in [the modern] world, . . . the values served by the

Fourth Amendment [are] more, not less, important."442
Section 2703(d) of the SCA, however, merely requires reasonable
suspicion for CSLI warrant issuance, which is a far less stringent evidentiary
standard than the Fourth Amendment's "substantially higher"" 3 probable cause
standard.44 4 Consequently, § 2703(d) is constitutionally deficient and judicial
reliance on its language is improper." 5 The Eleventh Circuit in the Davis panel

435
436

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
CLANCY, supra note 42.

437
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551,
559 (2004) (finding warrantless searches and seizures "presumptively unreasonable").
438
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2013).

439

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803) (holding that acts of Congress "repugnant to
the constitution cannot become a law" (emphasis added)).
441
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
442
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
440

United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, Nos.
124659(L), 124825, 2015 WL 6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015).
4"
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2013).
44

445

See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 138.
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decision appropriately recognized that "obtaining .. . [CSLI] without a warrant
[supported by probable cause] is a Fourth Amendment violation."4 6 Likewise,
because federal code is subordinate to the Constitution, the Third Circuit in
Provider,"' the Fifth Circuit in Historical,"8 and the Eleventh Circuit in its en
banc Davis decision44 9 were mistaken to place any stock in § 2703(d), as its
plain language is clearly at odds with the Fourth Amendment-specifically its
probable cause requirement.45 0
However, Supreme Court precedent holds that the protections of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures
are triggered only if one maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
object intruded on by the search or seizure. 45 1 Accordingly, the next Section
will address whether cell phone users possess a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their CSLI.
C. Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy and the Third-PartyDoctrine
Every day, people utilize public thoroughfares while traveling to public
locations to conduct affairs they nevertheless intend to keep private. Most
persons intend to keep secret the fact that they are treating terminal cancer,
considering an abortion, or seeking therapy for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
after multiple combat deployments.4 52 Society, in turn, would likely recognize
as reasonable such subjective expectations of privacy.
However, if these individuals carried a powered cell phone during their
trips, a CSLI record documenting the journey was created and archived by their
cell phone service providers.453 And so long as that information is simply
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation, the SCA enables law
enforcement to compel cell phone service providers to turn the record over.4 54

United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir.), vacated, 573 F. App'x 925 (11th
Cir. 2014), aff'd on reh'g, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).
447
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 315 (3d Cir. 2010).
44
In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir.
2013) (finding that the "reasonable grounds" requirement of the SCA is not "per se
unconstitutional").
449
Davis, 785 F.3d at 505-06.
450
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
451
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
452
See, e.g., supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
446

453
See Harkins, supra note 15, at 1877 (indicating that a new CSLI record is created
approximately once every seven seconds through a process known as registration in which cell
phones communicate with the nearest cell phone tower to find the tower with the strongest
reception).
454
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2013).
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Once in the hands of law enforcement, historical CSLI records allow the
government to retrace months of a cell phone user's past whereabouts
regardless of their private or sensitive nature.4 5
The following subsections will explain why cell phone users have a
subjective expectation of privacy in historical CSLI and why society is
prepared to declare this expectation as objectively reasonable.456 This analysis
will also argue that the third-party exception doctrine is inapplicable to CSLI
and that, even if the third-party doctrine applies to some information disclosed
to third-parties, cell phone users do not voluntarily disclose their CSLI to thirdparty service providers.
1.

Cell Phone Users Have a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in
Historical CSLI Records

Under Katz, the first question to be answered when a law or action is
challenged on the basis that it violates the privacy protections of the Fourth
Amendment is whether the complainant has a subjective expectation of privacy
in the information to be searched.457 Whereas the courts have long made the
home the heartland of an individual's subjective expectation of privacy against
government searches,458 in recent years the Supreme Court has signaled an
increasing willingness to find a subjective expectation of privacy in location
records generated by tracking devices.459
To establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, one must take
"precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy.
For example, in
United States v. Chadwick,4 61 the Supreme Court ruled that placing personal
effects in a "double-locked footlocker," was sufficient to manifest an
expectation of privacy that the contents would remain free from public
examination.462 Similarly, in Katz, the Supreme Court held that one who
occupies a telephone booth, shuts the door behind him, and pays to connect his

455
See, e.g., Brief for ACLU Found. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 3, United
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), 2014 WL 7006394, at *3 [hereinafter Amici
Brief] (noting that "law enforcement obtained 67 days of [CSLI] for [Davis's] phone without a
warrant").
456
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
457
458

Id
Id

459
See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012).
460
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
461

462

433 U.S. 1 (1977).
Id. at 11.
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call "is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world.'A 63
In order for a cell phone user to assert a valid privacy interest in his
CSLI, he must refuse to authorize his service provider's creation and
preservation of CSLI records. 4 64 However, as society becomes more heavily
reliant on the utility of the cell phone, the practicality of such a proposition
becomes less tenable. Strict application of such a rule would require one to cut
himself off from the most prevalent and effective communication device
available.465 Surely the Fourth Amendment does not require one to become a
recluse in order to enjoy its protections.466
Moreover, strict application of the Katz jurisprudence dictates that as
societal awareness of the existence and operation of CSLI increases, one day it
will become impossible to successfully claim a subjective expectation of
privacy in it. Ultimately, it would become impossible for one to assert his
subjective expectation of privacy in even the most private of affairs simply
because he carried a device so universal 467 "that the proverbial visitor from
Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy." 46 8
However, even if such an absurd outcome were to one day obtain, that
day has likely not yet arrived. A 2014 poll revealed that 82% of adults 'feel as
though the details of their physical location gathered over a period of time' is
'very sensitive' or 'somewhat sensitive."'4 69 Similarly, a 2008 study found that
73% of cell phone users surveyed supported "a law that required the police to
convince a judge that a crime has been committed before obtaining [historical]

463

Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
464
See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 536 (11th Cir. 2015). Wooden adherence to the
third-party doctrine dictates that cell phone users cannot maintain a privacy interest in their CSLI
because service contracts and privacy policies typically warn of CSLI collection and possible
disclosure to law enforcement. Id.
465
See id. at 525 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring) ("In our time, unless a person is willing to live
'off the grid,' it is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing the most personal of information to
third-party service providers on a constant basis, just to navigate daily life.").
466
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (identifying
the issue that "unless a person is willing to forego use of what for many has become a personal or
professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance").
467
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). Chief Justice Roberts noted that:
Now it is the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains,
who is the exception. According to one poll, nearly three-quarters of smart
phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time,
with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower.
Id.
468

469

Id
Davis, 785 F.3d at 538 (quoting MARY MADDEN,

PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC

PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 34 (2014), http://www.

pewinternet.org/files/2014/1 1/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_ 11214.pdf).
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location information from the cell phone company.
Nearly as many
respondents supported a statute requiring law enforcement to provide notice to
a cell phone user whose CSLI it sought from the service provider.4 71 Moreover,
as the government admitted in its closing argument in the trial that precipitated
the Eleventh Circuit's Davis decision, Davis and his co-defendants "probably
had no idea that by bringing their cell phones with them to these robberies,
they were allowing [their cellular service provider] and now all of you to
follow their movements on the days and at the times of the robberies."4 72
Accordingly, courts have, at times, accepted that the average cell phone
user maintains a subjective interest of privacy in CSLI.473 However, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment are not effectuated unless both prongs of
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test are satisfied.474 Not only must
the complainant have a subjective expectation of privacy, society must also be
willing to recognize his expectation as objectively reasonable.475
2.

Society Is Prepared to Recognize this Expectation as Objectively
Reasonable

Under Katz, the second question to be answered by Fourth Amendment
analysis is whether the subjective expectation of privacy established by a
complainant is one society is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable.476
Whether one's claim of privacy is objectively reasonable is determined in light
of all the circumstances.477 The Court has recognized that no one factor is
determinative,47 8 and that "[r]easonableness is determined by considering such
factors as the precautions a person takes to maintain his privacy, the way he

470

JENNIFER KING & CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, RESEARCH REPORT: A SUPERMAJORITY
OF
CALIFORNIANS SUPPORTS LIMITS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO CELL PHONE LOCATION
INFORMATION 16 (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public comments/

beyond-voice-mapping-mobile-marketplace-534331-00005/534331-00005.pdf.
471
Id. (finding that 72% of respondents voted to receive notice when police sought the CSLI).
472
United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir.) (emphasis added), vacated, 573 F.
App'x 925 (11th Cir. 2014), aff'd on reh'g, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (admitting that Davis
"could not have known" his cell phone "was tracking his every movement").
473
See, e.g., Davis, 785 F.3d at 539.
474
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
475
Id.
476

Id.

477
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152 (1978) ("The ultimate question, therefore, is whether
one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding
circumstances.").
478
Id
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uses a location, the history of the Fourth Amendment, the property interests
involved, and society's recognition of customary behavior.'A79
Bearing qualities analogous to the modem CSLI-producing cell phone
is yesterday's public telephone. As was true of a public telephone booth in the
Katz era, toda 's cell phones are a "vital means of communications for many
Americans,"4 8 but to a far greater degree.481 Whereas one previously had to
locate a pay phone on a street corner, in a commercial establishment, or mass
transit hub, now more than 90% of American adults own a cell phone.482 Cell
phones have become so pervasive that, as Chief Justice Roberts quipped, an
alien might mistake it for an appendage,48 3 and the voice and text conversations
they facilitate are so inescapable that some may consider them to be "essential
means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.A84
Even today's average American youth is so attached to her cell phone that she
sends upwards of 60 text messages per day.4 85 The grip cell phones have on
Americans of all ages and walks of life seemingly tightens daily.
Katz admittedly protected the content of a telephone call, not Katz's
presence within the booth.486 However, the Court protected the content of
Katz's phone calls by explaining that "[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly
is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication." 4 87 Courts also should protect CSLI from warrantless
government intrusion because to read the Constitution more narrowly is to
ignore the vital role that cell phones play in modern life.
Moreover, although law enforcement interception of private
conversation is unquestionably intrusive, such interception often captures little
more than that-just talk. People say things they never intend to follow through

479

United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143

n.12).
480
481

See THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, supra note 427, at 231.
See Michael Isikoff, The Snitch in Your Pocket: Law Enforcement Is Tracking Americans'

Cell Phones in Real Time-Without the Benefit of a Warrant, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 1, 2010, at 40

(noting that, as of 2010, Americans owned 277 million cells phones); Christian Berg, Pay Phones
Reached Their Peak in "95, THE MORNING CALL (Mar. 18, 2001), http://articles.mcall.com/2001-

03-18/news/3340885_Itelephone-company-office-pay-bell-telephone
height, there were 2.6 million pay phones in the United States).
482

(estimating that, at their

Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewintemet.org/fact-

sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
483
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
484
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010).
485
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 542 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing AMANDA LENHART, PEW
RESEARCH CTR., TEENS, SMARTPHONES & TEXTING 2 (2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/

old-media//Files/Reports/2012/PIPTeensSmartphonesand_ Texting.pdf).
486
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) ("But what [Katz] sought to exclude
when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear.").
487
Id.
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with, intentionally bluff, boast, and outright lie. What does not lie is the CSLI
created by your cell phone. As the prosecution emphasized in Davis, it places
you in specific locations at specific times.4 88 Were CSLI not demonstrative of
the actual steps you took rather than those you merely said you would in the
future, there is little doubt that government would not utilize CSLI as a key
component of its prosecution strategy in many circumstantial cases.
Further, the indiscriminate nature of CSLI reveals one's movements
and actions irrespective of how sensitive or private. As Justice Sotomayor
noted in her Jones concurrence-the 2012 Supreme Court case striking down
warrantless GPS tracking-"I for one doubt that people would accept without
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web
site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year." 4 8 9
CSLI is unquestionably more invasive than browsing history. Whereas
one's browsing history may provide insight into desires, inclinations, and
possibly physical activities, CSLI is far more telling. It reveals the next level of
interest: the decision to actually travel to a given location, ostensibly to
observe, participate in, experience, or otherwise satisfy such curiosities. 4 9 0 The
D.C. Circuit observed the following:
[One] who knows all of another's travels can deduce whether
he is a weekly churchgoer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the
gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical
treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political
groups-and not just one such fact about [him], but all such
facts. 491
If Justice Sotomayor is correct, that society would be unwilling to
accept warrantless access to simple internet history, there is little doubt that
society would be significantly less willing to accept the modern practice of law
enforcement successfully forcing millions of annual warrantless disclosures of
one's CSLI records, 49249particularly for extended periods of time.493 Further, an

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490; Davis, 785 F.3d at 541 ("Mr. Davis's phone [was] literally
right up against the America Gas Station immediately preceding and after [the] robbery
occurred." (citing Transcript of Record at 61, Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (No. 285))). Davis's cell
phone was present "literally . . . right next door to the Walgreen's just before and just after the
store was robbed." Davis, 785 F.3d at 541.
489
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012).
490
See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
491
Id.
488

492

See Hearing on Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform and the Revolution in

&

Location Based Technologies and Services Before the Subcomm. on Constitution, Civil Rights,
Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Hon.
Stephen W. Smith, U.S. Mag. J.) ("A reasonable estimate is that the total number of electronic
surveillance orders issued at the federal level each year substantially exceeds 10,000.").

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss2/11

54

Boyce: The Stored Communications Act: Property Law Enforcement Tool or I
THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

2015]

973

additional contingent of five Jones Justices subscribed to the notion that
persons maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in records of their
physical movements obtained by the accumulation of tracking information.4 94
Most recently, in the unanimous Riley decision-the 2014 Supreme Court
decision prohibiting warrantless examination of an arrestee's cell phone
pursuant to a lawful arrest-the Supreme Court unequivocally expressed a
distinct respect for the sanctity of personal information contained on one's cell
phone.4 95
Taken together, Jones and Riley clearly signal an increasingly potent
and controlling sentiment on the Supreme Court that obtaining digitally
conveyed tracking information is a violation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. 49 6 Moreover, given that over five-eighths of adults deem
extensive records of their physical movements to be sensitive or extremely
sensitive, 49 7 and nearly three-quarters of individuals favor police being forced
to obtain a warrant before accessing CSLI," the assertion of privacy in
historical CSLI is generally held by society to be objectively reasonable.
Accordingly, the average American cell phone user maintains a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as objectively
reasonable, satisfying the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. However,
even if a person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy, Supreme Court
precedent holds that the attendant protections of the Fourth Amendment are
destroyed if he voluntarily conveys that information to a third-party.49 9 The
following subsection discusses the third-party exception doctrine and argues
that this exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not
apply to CSLI.
3.

CSLI Does Not Succumb to the Third-Party Exception Doctrine

The Fourth Amendment does not protect the information one
knowingly exposes to a third-party, regardless of whether the location of
exposure is itself private.500 Many courts rely largely on this concept to validate

493
See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (invalidating 28 days of warrantless tracking of the
defendant); Amici Brief, supra note 455, at 3.
494
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954, 957.
495
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014) (holding unanimously that
"[m]odem cell phones . . hold for many Americans the 'privacies of life"' (quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).
496
Id. at 2495; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
497
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 538 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting MADDEN, supra note
469, at 34).

498

KiNG & HOOFNAGLE, supra note 470.

499
500

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

Id.
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the government's acquisition of historical CSLI, as did the Fifth Circuit in
Historicalsor and the Eleventh Circuit in its en banc Davis 50 2 decision. The
conclusion that exposure of CSLI to third-parties is voluntary is often rooted in
the notions that (1) no one is forced to buy, carry, or use a cell phone, 03 and (2)
cell service contracts typically include notice provisions making users aware
that use of that company's cell service creates CSLI that is stored.504 Both
assumptions, when critically examined, prove to be unpersuasive as a basis to
withhold the protections of the Fourth Amendment from CSLL
First, as the Supreme Court noted in Riley, cell phones are now "a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life."sos If people wish to reasonably
participate in society, they must "reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third-parties in the course of carrying out [even the most]
mundane tasks."so6 For example, cell phone users convey such commonplace
information as the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cell phone
service providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which
they correspond to their internet service providers; and the books, groceries,
and medications they purchase to online retailers.507 Accordingly, as Judge
Rosenbaum noted in her Davis concurrence, "unless a person is willing to 'live
off the grid,' it is nearly impossible to avoid disclosing the most personal of
information to third-party service providers on a constant basis, just to navigate
personal life."5 0 s
Thus, although no one is literally forced by another to use a cell phone,
its use has become practically unavoidable. Not only are cell phones
ubiquitous, but for a growing segment of the population they are essential to

501
In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614 (5th Cir.
2013) (concluding that "a user voluntarily conveys [CSLI] when he places a call, even though he
does not directly inform his service provider of the location of the nearest cell phone tower").
Such disclosure is voluntary because

a cell phone user makes a choice to get a phone, to select a particular service
provider, and to make a call, and because he knows that the call conveys cell
site information, the provider retains this information, and the provider will
turn it over to the police if they have a court order, he voluntarily conveys his

cell site data each time he makes a call.
Id.
502

Davis, 785 F.3d 498.

See id. at 520 (Pryor, J., concurring) ("If a telephone caller does not want to reveal dialed
numbers to the telephone company, he has another option: don't place a call. If a cell phone user
does not want to reveal his location to a cellular carrier, he also has another option: turn off the
503

cell phone.").
5
505

In re Historical,724 F.3d at 613.

506

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

507

Id.

sos

Davis, 785 F.3d at 525 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
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cultural and economic participation.5 09 Thus, full participation in modern
society almost requires disclosure of certain digital information to thirdparties.5 1 0 As the Fourth Circuit noted in Graham, "[p]eople cannot be deemed
to have volunteered to forfeit expectations of privacy [in CSLI] by simply
seeking active participation in society through use of their cell phones."su
CSLI cannot, therefore, be voluntarily conveyed in any real sense, as the cell
phones that create it are virtually mandatory to today's existence. Any
conclusion to the contrary fails to appreciate the cell phone's role as a
centerpiece of contemporary life in this country.
Furthermore, the foundational third-party doctrine case relevant to
CSLI was decided nearly 40 years ago in Smith v. Marylandl2 in the context of
numbers manually dialed on a landline telephone. Society has significantly
changed since Smith, however, as the degree with which the average citizen
exposes information has increased in the last 40 years "by orders of
magnitude."5 13 Nevertheless, for nearly four decades, the Supreme Court has
ignored the march of technology: if one uses a ubiquitous and vital tool like the
cell phone, his Fourth Amendment rights are eliminated simply because the use
of that tool is necessarily routed through third-parties.5 14
Today, strict application of the outmoded third-party doctrine renders
the protections of the Fourth Amendment and the use of indispensable modern
technologies, such as cell phones, mutually exclusive. Justice Marshall foresaw
such an outcome in his Smith dissent, when he warned that the third-party
doctrine forces "a person ... to forgo use of what for many has become a
personal or professional necessity . . . [or] accept the risk of surveillance. 5 s 5
Everyday life in today's world, however, is totally integrated with third-partyprovided technological services and is nothing short of "a steroidal version of

United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted,
Nos. 12-4659(L), 12-4825, 2015 WL 6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015).
510
Davis, 785 F.3d at 522 ("[P]ractical necessities now require individuals to share
509

information about themselves 'with trusted individuals and institutions for limited purposes."'
(quoting STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 8 (2012))).

511
512

513

Graham, 796 F.3d at 356.
442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979).
Davis, 785 F.3d at 538 (Martin, J., dissenting).

514
See Matthew S. Adams, Update: Eleventh Circuit En Banc Showdown Set for February
24th on Key ConstitutionalIssue Surrounding Cell Phone Tower Data, Fox ROTHSCHILD LLP
(Jan. 12, 2015), http://ediscoverystage.foxrothschild.com/2015/01/articles/evidence/update-en(noting that in its amicus brief
banc-showdown-at-the-eleventh-circuit-court-of-appeals-set/

AT&T argued that "[n]othing in Smith or Miller requires that individuals must choose between
participating in the new digital world through use of their mobile devices and retaining the
Fourth Amendment's protections").
515
Davis, 785 F.3d at 525 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring) (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 750

(Marshall, J., dissenting)).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

57

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 11

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

976

[Vol. 118

the problems Justice[] Marshall ... envisioned" nearly four decades ago.
Thus, with the advent of every new technology, the third-party doctrine forces
Americans to "surrender more and more of our historically protected Fourth
Amendment interests to unreasonable searches and seizures."
Justice Sotomayor recognized this troubling truth when she argued in
her Jones concurrence that it is therefore likely necessary for the Supreme
Court to reconsider the fundamental premise of the third-party doctrine,
particularly as manifested in the current digital context, because it "is ill suited
to the digital age." 18 As the Fourth Circuit commented in Graham, the fact that
a third-party indiscriminately records a person's movements over an extended
period of time, both in public and in private, must not eliminate her expectation
of privacy in her CSLI.519 "Applying the third-party doctrine in this context
would simply permit the government to convert an individual's cell phone into
a tracking device by examining the massive bank of location information
retained by her service provider, and to do so without probable cause., 5 20
Similarly, Congress needs to reexamine the wisdom of such provisions of the
SCA as § 2703(d), as the SCA has not been significantly revised since it was
passed into law in 1986. As the Supreme Court established in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,521 "[i]f times have changed, reducing everyman's scope to do as he
pleases in an urban and industrial world, ... the values served by the Fourth
Amendment [are] more, not less, important." 52 2
Finally, the fact that cell phone contracts may contain provisions
indicating that CSLI will be created and stored does not mean cell phone users
actually give their consent to these practices.523 Not only are cell phone service
contracts typically incredibly voluminous, 524 they are pointless to read.5 2 5 They
are filled with pages of legal jargon that is meaningless to the average citizen,
and are even pointless to read for "expert[s] in contract law," including "the

516

Id.

517

Id. at 532-33.

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 357 (4th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, Nos.
12-4659(L), 12-4825, 2015 WL 6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015).
518

519

520

Id.

403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Davis, 785 F.3d at 533 (Pryor, J., dissenting) (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455
(alteration in original)).
523
See Why Do We Blindly Sign Terms of Service Agreements?, NPR (Sept. 1, 2014, 4:07
http://www.npr.org/2014/09/01/345044359/why-do-we-blindly-sign-terms-of-servicePM),
agreements.
524
See, e.g., id. (noting that the 2014 Apple iTunes contract is 55 pages of eight-point font
that reaches 30 feet when printed).
525
See id.
521

522
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lawyers that drafted" them.5 26 Further prohibiting comprehension of their terms
is the fact that user agreements often contain so "many typos" that they appear
to have gone unread by the disclosers themselves.52 7
Even if, however, the average cell phone user were able to penetrate
the legalese of her cell phone service contract, its language may say nothing of
the service provider disclosing her CSLI to third-parties.528 In Graham, for
example, the Sprint/Nextel service agreement "only state[d] that Sprint/Nextel
collects information about the phone's location-not that it discloses this
information to the government or anyone else." 5 29 Thus, if many cell phone
contracts do not even mention potential disclosure of CSLI by the service
provider to third-parties, and world-renowned contract attorneys cannot discern
the intricacies of the content actually appearing in today's user agreements,
then there is no way that the average citizen has such ability. Because cell
phone users are forced to sign service contracts regardless of the privacy
conditions contained therein, and such agreements are either silent on CSLI
disclosure or unintelligibly dense to even the most seasoned contract attorney,
agreeing to the terms of a cell phone service contract does not constitute
anything approaching consent to disclosure of CSLI.
The rigid and decades-old third-party doctrine does not recognize the
reality of the 21st century, however. Thus, as Justice Sotomayor appropriately
appreciated in Jones, it has become abundantly clear that the traditional thirdparty doctrine is "ill suited" for "the digital age." 53 0 Individuals, therefore,
maintain a subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as objectively reasonable, notwithstanding the third-party doctrine
of the Fourth Amendment.
4. The Needs of Law Enforcement Do Not Justify Warrantless Access
to CSLI
Law enforcement officials argue that the balancing of Americans'
liberty interest in individual privacy against the government's interest in
conducting effective law enforcement dictates that § 2703(d) of the SCA
should be upheld. 5 3 1 They contend that because § 2703(d) helps conserve

526

Id.

527

Id.

United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc granted, Nos.
12-4659(L), 12-4825, 2015 WL 6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015).
529
Id.
530
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
528

Government's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 14-15, United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d
531
498 (1lth Cir. 2015) (No. 12-12928-EE) (contending that striking § 2703(d) would constitute a
"substantial burden" that "deprives law-enforcement authorities of an important investigative
tool, without yielding any appreciable real-world privacy gains by way of compensation").
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investigative resources and "deflect suspicions from the innocent,"532 easy
access to CSLI is extremely valuable during the early stages of criminal
investigations before probable cause is cultivated.
Not only does acquisition
of CSLI under § 2703(d) "come at a negligible cost to privacy," they say, to
curtail such an effective investigative tool would constitute a substantial burden
on law enforcement.53 4 Accordingly, law enforcement officials maintain that
courts should continue to accept the constitutionality of § 2703(d)'s reasonable
suspicion CSLI warrants.535
However, based on the Supreme Court's unanimous ruling in its 2014
Riley decision, § 2703(d) of the SCA cannot survive simply because it is
helpful to law enforcement.53 6 In Riley, the Supreme Court held that warrantless
searches of arrestees' cell phones are unconstitutional, notwithstanding the
reality that the inability to conduct such searches "will have an impact on the
ability of law enforcement to combat crime. "37 The Supreme Court also
acknowledged that cell phones and the records they create are frequently troves
of investigative information for law enforcement.5 38 Nevertheless, the Riley
Court dismissed such contentions by concluding that "[p]rivacy comes at a
cost."5 39

The Supreme Court's decision in Riley further foreclosed such costbenefit arguments of law enforcement. 54 0 The Riley decision held that "the
[Fourth Amendment's probable cause] warrant requirement is 'an important
working part of our machinery of government' not merely 'an inconvenience to
be somehow "weighed" against the claims of police efficiency."' 54 1 Therefore,
the Eleventh Circuit's balancing in its Davis decision, which held that the
constitutionality of a search or seizure hinges on its reasonableness, and that
reasonableness is based "on the one hand, [by] the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests,"542 was squarely
rejected by Riley.

532

533
534
5

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).

537

Id.

538

Id.

539

Id.
Id.

540

Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
542
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 517 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
541
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Additionally, in Riley, the Supreme Court raised the practical reality that,
even if such balancing were proper, the difficulties imposed on law
enforcement by forcing the acquisition of a warrant have largely been assuaged
by the ability of police officers in many jurisdictions to quickly obtain warrants
via e-mail.543 Moreover, beyond often being able to obtain warrants in a matter
of minutes, commentators have observed that the "[t]he Supreme Court has set
the standard for the quality of information [supporting warrants] so low that
judges can hardly be expected to uncover baseless requests." 5" Thus, any
imposition suffered by police being forced to get a warrant is negligible.
Finally, in Riley, the government argued that because co-conspirators
can destroy evidence stored on cell phones by remotely wiping the contents of
an arrestee's cell phone, an arrest is a sufficiently exigent circumstance to
necessitate obfuscation of the warrant requirement. 5 4 5 Riley addressed and
dismissed such arguments as too remote and easily avoidable, particularly
because law enforcement can place confiscated cell phones in signal-blocking
CSLI is yet further removed from exigent circumstances
protective cases.
because there is no reasonable basis to believe that cell phone service
providers-engaged in the practice of routinely accumulating and storing CSLI
to better serve their customers-will erase CSLI records before a warrant can
reasonably be obtained. 547 No realistic argument can be made that law
enforcement runs the risk of losing valuable CSLI evidence by adhering to the
warrant requirement.54 8
Therefore, § 2703(d) of the SCA cannot be justified on the basis that its
provision for the acquisition of CSLI upon showing of reasonable suspicion
conveniences law enforcement. Expediency is not a basis upon which the
Constitution may be discarded, notwithstanding that a more cumbersome
process might inhibit the most effective law enforcement techniques.

543
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (noting that in many jurisdictions police officers are able to email warrant applications to judges and receive e-mail responses within 15 minutes (citing
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561-63 (2013))).
54
Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amendment's Principled
ProtectionofPrivacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 575, 592-93 (2008).
545
See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486.
546
See id. at 2487 ("[I]f [law enforcement officers] are concerned about encryption or other
potential problems, they can . . . place [a phone] in an enclosure that isolates the phone from
radio waves. Such devices are commonly called 'Faraday bags' . . . . They are essentially
sandwich bags made of aluminum foil: cheap, lightweight, and easy to use.").
547
See Davis, 785 F.3d at 543 ("Nor is cell site data the type of information which would
spoil or perish during the short time it takes to get a warrant.").
548

Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Section 2703(d) of the SCA violates the Fourth Amendment because
individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in CSLI, and thus the
government must first obtain a warrant supported by probable cause to access
CSLI. First, § 2703(d) stands in opposition to the Founders' intent in drafting
and ratifying the Fourth Amendment to protect against the unbridled authority
of the government to examine one's private affairs. Second, compelling the
production of CSLI is clearly a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, and the
plain language of the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to first
obtain a warrant that is supported by probable cause. Third, individuals
typically maintain a subjective expectation of privacy in CSLI that society is
willing to recognize as objectively reasonable. Fourth, CSLI does not succumb
to the Fourth Amendment's third-party exception doctrine. Fifth, and finally,
the needs of law enforcement do not justify warrantless access to CSLI.
The Fourth Amendment fundamentally stands for the proposition that
citizens have the "right to be left alone."549 If the use of a device indispensable
to participation in modern society subjects one's every move to warrantless
examination by law enforcement, the Fourth Amendment has been utterly
annulled. The time is now for the Supreme Court and, more importantly,
Congress to recognize that § 2703(d) of the SCA is unconstitutional and in dire
need of revision. The very essence of what it means to be a free American
demands it.
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